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ABSTRACT
Spheres of Identity:
Theorizing Social Categorization and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice Officials
by
Kwan-Lamar Blount-Hill
Advisor: Eric L. Piza, Ph.D.
Identity is of central importance in the subjective experience of justice and assessments of legitimacy.
In this study, the researcher explores whether perceptions of legitimacy are constructed differently
across social group identity, particularly where social groups differ in relation to government (e.g.,
outgroup or ingroup). The analyses are conducted using data from a procedural justice study
conducted in two U. S. cities. The findings suggest evidence of a generally similar construction of
legitimacy though with important dissimilarities based on social group. Additionally, certain
respondents’ narratives follow common narrative scripts in describing interactions with police,
suggestive of a shared master narrative that guides interpretations among members of a marginalized
social group. I used three theories of identity to explore:
•

Do different social groups assess the legitimacy of criminal justice system (CJS) officials
similarly or differently?

•

Do social groups that view government as an ingroup resource consider an authority figure’s
intragroup role in assessing CJS legitimacy?

•

Is the link between procedural justice and legitimacy mediated by individuals’ ingroup or
outgroup status in relation to the government?

•

Do marginalized outgroups interpret their perceptions of government through collective
frames like cultural master narratives or through individual experiences?
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown was shot and killed by Patrol Officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson,
Missouri (Alter, 2014). He was a young man, Black and unarmed, and his death came to represent the
scores of individuals with similar descriptions killed by police. In the wake of community-wide
outrage, the police department’s response and the community’s reaction could serve as a study in
legitimacy. (Legitimacy researchers have, in fact, studied this incident; exempli gratia, Wolfe & Nix,
2016). Police legitimacy has been defined as the quality or trait of police officials that allows law
enforcement to command respect and expect obedience (Tyler, 2004). To be legitimate is, in other
words, the ability of police to claim – and act on claims of – authority. When this quality is lacking,
the public disregards, dismisses or rebels against police claims of authority, often resulting in the civil
unrest that followed the Brown incident. Therefore, police practitioners have an imperative to
maintain and enhance their legitimacy. Criminal justice scholars whose work is to be relevant to those
police administrators must also endeavor to understand it.
The present study takes up this work by questioning how social identity influences civilian
assessments of legal authorities and their legitimacy, particularly the police. In response to Ferguson’s
unrest following Brown’s death, the State Highway Patrol was called to restore order in Ferguson
(Alter, 2014). This could be based merely on a difference in perceived competence. However, it might
also reflect a calculation that one agency might have legitimacy when another did not. The captain
chosen to lead this effort was Ron Johnson, a Black officer and a choice that may have, in addition to
his competence, also reflected a view that an individual might carry legitimacy where his profession
had lost it. This response was not unique. After Oscar Grant’s murder in 2009, Kenton Rainey was
installed as chief of the Bay Area Rapid Transit Police (Berton, 2010). He, like Grant, was Black and
had a history of challenging law enforcement in response to community complaints of biased and
1|Page

discriminatory policing. More recently, after the 2018 shooting of Stephon Clark in Sacramento,
members of the community who decried racism with the Sacramento Police Department nonetheless
rallied around Chief Daniel Hahn, the agency’s first Black chief and hailed as “the chosen one,” “our
Barack Obama,” and “the messiah” (Simon & Simon, 2018).
Though simple reactions, each of these, implicitly if not explicitly, reflect the central role of
identity in social life. Legitimacy researchers have taken on increasingly nuanced perspectives on the
nature of police legitimacy. Studies have now examined the legal system legitimacy and that of specific
enforcement organizations, as well as correlates of legitimacy, such as trust, eared by individual officers
(Murphy et alia, 2017; Harkin, 2015; Brunson & Gau, 2015; Cherney & Murphy, 2013, 2011; Innes,
2006). While much of this work focuses on particularly on local police, legitimacy researchers have
also examined courts (e.g., Kaiser & Holtfreter, 2016) and correctional systems (e.g., Steiner &
Wooldredge, 2018). Moreover, though justice actors are distinct, researchers have also explored the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system (CJS) as a whole (Fine et al., 2016). Still more, CJS legitimacy
is subsumed to some degree in the legitimacy of overall government (Soss & Weaver, 2017).
In the area of police legitimacy, Bradford’s recent (2014; et al., 2014; et al., 2015) work has
explicitly addressed the relationship between social identity and legitimation. This present work builds
upon his in seeking the answer to the following: How does an individual’s social identity influence
how they perceive and react to police officials? I broaden the inquiry to include not just police
legitimacy, but perceptions of the overall justice system. Moreover, criminological explanations of
identity theories have sometimes conflated the precepts of Tajfel’s (1972) social identity theory and
Styker’s (1980) structural symbolic interactionist (SSI) theory (id est “identity theory”).1 Tom Tyler’s

Structural symbolic interactionism has been rebranded “identity theory” almost from its inception and it is the
dominant theory of identity arising from the sociological sciences. However, because its original name both hints at its
roots in symbolic interactionism (Stryker, 2007) and better distinguishes it as separate from the other identity theories I
utilize in this discussion, I will keep to calling it structural symbolic interactionism (or SSI, as I will abbreviate it below).
1
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adaptations of social identity theory explain legitimation of legal authorities one way (through social
group identity; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000), though explanations emanating from SSI
likely point to alternative explanations. In this study, I explore what these differing conclusions might
be and whether the present data support one set over the other. A third question in this research
explores a developing line of narrative identity research (e.g., McLean et al., 2018) and the role that
cultural master narrative may have as a mechanism of social identity’s influence on legitimation.
Finally, I explore whether and how social group identity is impacted by an individual’s perceptions of
procedural justice during a specific interaction with a police official.
For these explorations, I utilize quantitative and qualitative datasets from a 2016 study by the
Center for Court Innovation (CCI). The study was funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
to collect data on individuals’ perceptions of procedural justice and fair treatment by the municipal
justice systems in Newark, New Jersey, and in Cleveland, Ohio. The study consisted of 807 in-person
surveys and 101 in-depth interviews (near evenly split across the two cities), sampled for respondents
having at least low-level criminal justice experience. I use this data to explore the following questions:
1. Do different social groups assess the legitimacy of criminal justice system (CJS) officials
similarly or differently?
2. Do social groups that view government as an ingroup resource consider an authority figure’s
intragroup role in assessing CJS legitimacy?
3. Is the link between procedural justice and legitimacy mediated by individuals’ ingroup or
outgroup status in relation to the government?
4. Do marginalized outgroups interpret their perceptions of government through collective
frames like cultural master narratives or through individual experiences?
The first three questions are drawn from three unique bodies of literature: Tajfel’s (1972) social identity
theory, Stryker’s (1980) structural symbolic interactionist theory (“identity theory”), and McLean’s
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(2008) and others’ work on cultural master narratives from the narrative identity perspective (see
McAdams, 1985). The fourth draws this literature into realm of Tyler’s (1988) procedural justice work
and the vast criminal justice literature that has spawned from it.
In summation of what I present below, I advance a spheres-of-identity hypothesis, an attempt at
a more complete social identity theory of legitimation. Under my hypothesized theoretical model,
individuals view legal officials through a collection of prisms, group-based (as explained by social identity
theory), role-based (as explained by SSI), and individualistically (as argued by social identity theorists and
symbolic interactionists alike). I go on to offer that the ways individuals are socialized to accept,
understand and apply these prisms is largely through narrative adoption, taking from heuristic story
templates expressed in their ingroup’s cultural master narratives. At core, legitimation and resultant
perceptions of legitimacy are formed based on how authorities are categorized by social group
(ingroup or outgroup?), judged by role expectations (compliant or noncompliant?) and by
interpersonal connection, all interpreted into and through longer-running narratives of authority –
officers’ spheres of identity.
Considering perceptual complexities highlights potential avenues to further build on current
theories of legitimacy. This study will add to the understanding of how perceptions of CJS actors and
their legitimacy is formed in legitimation processes shaped by identity. Without answers to questions
such as these, policing and other institutions will continue to rely on assumptions about citizen
perception that may be less nuanced than necessary to understand anything close to the full scope of
their social environs. I structure this dissertation in four primary chapters. Chapter 2 lays the theoretic
foundations of this study, reviewing current literature and orienting this study within the social identity
landscape. Chapter 3 explains the research methods used, data obtained, and analytic approach taken
to explore these concepts. Chapter 4 presents the results of the study. Chapter 5 concludes the
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implications of this work for theory and policy, and a note on the limitations to be addressed in future
studies.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Why the need for legitimacy?
In the law enforcement context, legitimacy is necessary for a variety of reasons: First, limitations in
police personnel and resources mean that enforcement authorities cannot be a ubiquitous presence at
all places nor at all times (Tyler, 2004; Wolfe, 2011). These limitations necessitate an environment in
which most people obey the law most of the time, leaving police to concentrate on only a small
quantity of lawbreakers at any given moment. Second, when police response is required, resolutions
are more quickly arrived at, disputes more rapidly dissolved, and incidents more efficiently managed
if participant parties defer to enforcement agents (Schulhofer et al., 2011; Wells, 2007). Furthermore,
policing is a largely reactive process, and civilian-initiated contacts are the primary catalyst for law
enforcement action. Reports of current criminal activity, witness statements about past crimes
committed, and information regarding the whereabouts of suspects or evidence are critical to the
successful detection and prosecution of criminal malfeasance (Braga et al., 2014). Finally, community
buy-in to police legitimacy tends to nurture within the neighborhood a willingness to engage in crimesuppressive ventures, from organized community surveillance, to citizen patrols, and involvement in
crime prevention programs (Kochel, 2012; Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Tyler, 2004). Proactive,
preventative efforts, such as “crime watch” programs, are centered on the idea that the public is the
most useful method of detecting crime, and community policing initiatives, such as neighborhood
meetings, require the participation of the general citizenry to bring to fore neighborhood concerns.
Police legitimacy generates cooperation between police and community (Gau et al., 2012; Reisig et al.,
2011).
In implicit recognition of this truth, establishing and enhancing the legitimacy of government
agents of crime control has been an agreed-upon goal of criminal justice policymakers dating back at
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least to the work of Vollmer and the inception of the discipline (Wilson, 1953). Legitimacy is important
because it inspires the public along a cooperative continuum, from mere compliance (obedience or
“dull compulsion”) to satisfaction (contentment and ungrudging compliance) to support (expressions
of satisfaction to police and others) to voluntary cooperation (assisting in various ways when asked)
to engagement (assisting at its own initiation) (Blount-Hill & Yeom, 2016). It is quality important not
only for police, but for the operation of government generally, including other CJS actors like judges
or correctional officers.
Of course, authorities can shape public behavior through use of force and the risk of sanction
for noncompliance. However, in democratic societies, authorities rely on public willingness to
voluntarily defer out of a sense that institutions such as the police and courts are reasonable and just
(Scheingold, 1974; Easton, 1975). Egon Bittner posited that skill in policing is marked by an avoidance
of coercive force (cited in Dai, Frank, & Sun, 2011). These ethical qualities distinguish legitimacy from
coercion, reflecting the view that formal agents of social control act on behalf of the community and
exercise their authority in accord with principles of reasonable and appropriate conduct (Parsons,
1967; Sarat, 1977; Beetham, 1991). Police and other justice officials avoid the use of force and coercion
by inspiring voluntary compliance, relying upon legitimacy in accomplishing their goals (Mazerolle et
al., 2013a; Meares, 2009). Instead of concerning themselves with persuading citizens to trust in the
results of police actions – sometimes perceived as beneficial from the individual’s perspective, but just
as often adverse – police officers can build up confidence in and adherence to the legal process.
Acceptance of police authority among the public comes from legitimacy, a sentiment that, when held,
imposes an ethical requirement that authorities ought to be deferred to and obeyed.
Where legitimacy is absent, an individual is likely to challenge authorities, increasing the chance
for hostile encounters and the necessity of force to gain compliance (Harkin, 2015). Legitimacy
promotes a deferential atmosphere, as has been demonstrated across several studies over time and
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locale (Mazerolle et al., 2013a, 2013b). Considering police as an example, officers need to be able to
enforce the law with very little resistance, at least most of the time, in order to do so effectively and
with less risk to life and limb. Meanwhile, negative perceptions of the police cause “legitimacy deficits”
(Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Engel & Smith, 1975) and, often, the development of overall cynicism
toward all legal authorities and other community institutions (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Kirk &
Matsuda, 2011; Carr et al., 2007; Kane, 2005). The combined effects of increasing cynicism and
declining legitimacy begin a community down the path to full legitimacy crisis, defined as the point
where “an authority figure’s claims of entitlement to exercise power are ignored, disbelieved or
disputed” (Blount-Hill & St. John, 2017, p. 112). At that stage, the authority’s legitimacy is not just
viewed with skepticism; it is held not to exist at all.
Relatively recently – in fact, only within the last few decades – the essentiality of legitimacy
has prompted criminal justice scholars to begin exploring the concept in some depth. If my work is
to answer how perceived identity influences legitimacy, one must have a clear understanding of what
is meant by legitimacy. Defining legitimacy is fundamental to any deeper inquiry into its nature and how
it is obtained. Accordingly, this is a vital first step in determining what formula civilians use in assessing
the legitimacy of an authority figure and whether they do so by considering the many spheres of that
figure’s identity. I would sum legitimacy as the willingness of another to accept one’s authoritative
status. However, the concept of legitimacy spans disciplines and theoretical traditions, and, as such, is
still under debate.

Defining legitimacy
The CJS is, at core, a network of political entities emplaced to carry out political purposes as part of a
larger government and political regime. Political scientists have defined legitimacy as “convictions held
by members of political systems that political objects are morally proper or just simply appropriate”
8|Page

(Muller, 1970, p. 392). Easton’s (1965) work provides the most widely referenced foundation for this
line of theory (Gibson et al., 2003). Together with trust, Easton (1975) sees legitimacy as one
component of diffuse support, a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to
their wants” (p. 444). Easton also proposes three types of legitimacy: ideological legitimacy,
justification through ideological code; structural legitimacy, borne of individuals’ attachment to the
structures of authority; and personal legitimacy, coming from the appeal and charisma of authoritative
personalities (Muller, 1970).
While criminal justice officials are inherently representatives of a political state, much of
criminal justice thought on the legitimacy of legal authorities has, in fact, been shaped by social
psychologists. Tyler (1990) is the dominant scholar of legitimacy in social psychology, and his work
has most informed legitimacy theory within the field of law and society as well as criminal justice. He
defined legitimacy more technically as “the property that a rule or an authority has when others feel
obligated to voluntarily defer to that rule or authority” (Tyler 2006, p. 311). He later expanded this
definition to “the feeling of responsibility and obligation to follow the law, to accept the decisions of
legal authorities, and to cooperate with and help legal authorities to do their jobs” (Tyler, 2009, p.
313). In short, it is the quality that impels others to voluntarily follow an authority’s commands and
to rely upon the authority as master of its domain (Tankebe, 2013; Mazerolle et al., 2013b; Bottoms
& Tankebe, 2012; Gau et al., 2012; Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Wells, 2007; Tyler, 2004).
Tyler theorized a bifurcated understanding of the internal drivers of individuals’ legal
compliance, with morality being one such driver and legitimacy another (Tyler, 1990). In Tyler’s
conception, legitimacy is normative in nature, reliant on garnering civilian compliance through the
power of social relationships as opposed to substantive ideological or utilitarian outcomes. Scholars
have identified “trust and confidence” and “obligation to obey” as the two constructs comprising the
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legitimacy of the police, and these have become canonical ways of operationalizing the legitimacy of
criminal justice authorities (e.g., Tyler et al., 2010; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler
& Huo, 2002). These perceptions prompt citizens to allow an authority’s decisions to displace the
citizen’s own judgments on what is right.
Still, legitimacy scholars in the social psychological tradition have not coalesced around a
singular definition. Schulhofer, Tyler and Huq (2011) argue that at least three definitions of legitimacy
existed early on: legitimacy as (1) legality, or compliance with “the rule of law”; (2) conventionality, or
conformity with the public will; or (3) efficacy, successfulness in the reduction and suppression of
criminal activity. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) harken to Weber (1922/1968) and Beetham (1991) in
renewing interest in these norms and identify keeping within the bounds of the law, effectively serving
their purpose (and audiences’ needs), fair and just procedures, and fair and just distribution of
resources as key determinants of legitimacy. When adhered to, these, Tankebe (2013) asserts, establish
the “right to exercise power” (p. 103). Others have been content to accept a more amorphous
conception as normative alignment between authorities and their audiences, focusing much more
attention on the mechanisms of legitimation, the process by which an entity gains legitimacy (Huq et
al., 2017). These mechanisms include behavioral frames such as procedural justice or distributive
justice.
I have struggled with whether initial definitions truly capture the complexity of legitimacy as a
psychological construct. The “lodestar” of legitimacy is the individual’s willingness to substitute the
judgment of the authority for their own, relying on the authority to discern right behavior and enforce
normative behavioral standards (Blount-Hill, 2017). In defining how this came to be, I originally
proposed the following: “entitlement to exercise power granted by some collectively-accepted origin
of authority” (Blount-Hill & Yeom 2016, p. 52). Our attempt here was manifold. First, we wanted to
account for the variation in sources (or origins) of authority across polities and cultures. We also
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wanted to highlight the importance of group-level perceptions of legitimacy: Legitimacy requires
members of a collective community to hold the view that authorities play a socially appropriate role
in making and implementing rules governing public conduct (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler & Huo,
2002). It was important, finally, to connect legitimacy to the exercise of power – defined, in our mind,
as the ability to determine outcomes – and, in service of an authority-centric definition, we reframed
the public’s obligation as the authority’s entitlement. It is the perception of obligation on the part of
the governed to obey that marks a subject’s compliance behavior as having arisen from legitimacy
(Tankebe, 2013).
This definition drew upon Dworkin (1967), who touched upon concerns important in a search
for definitional clarity in legitimacy studies. In his philosophical work on the essence of rules, he
differentiates obedience due to obligation from obedience because of dull compulsion, compliance
from fear of reprisals for disobedience. Distinguishing being “obligated” and “obliged,” Dworkin
argues that the latter is based upon instrumentalist and utilitarian calculations, whereas his definition
of the former reflects the obligation to obey discussed in current legitimacy literature. He suggests that
authority figures must derive their right to obedience from a binding source, some sort of societal rule.
Finally, Dworkin determines that a rule is binding when a social group accepts it as so (see also Hart’s
(1961/1994) “rule of recognition” and Beetham’s (1991) statement that rules are legitimized through
conformity with a “common framework of belief”). Dworkin further states that a binding rule may
come in many different forms, as different as the communities in which they operate, all legitimated
by the community’s acceptance of it.
What becomes clear when one considers the philosophical underpinnings of legitimacy,
however, is that criminal justice scholars’ focus on legal authorities narrows its theoretical scope and
disconnects our theorizing from that of legitimacy scholars focused on other legitimized authorities.
Scholars in organization science have tended to focus on the interests of private firms. Suchman (1995)
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has most defined the discipline’s approach. He defined legitimacy for organizations as “a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). He proposed
three variants of legitimacy: Pragmatic legitimacy is founded on a legitimacy claimant’s appeal to
audiences’ utilitarian self-interests; moral legitimacy comes when claimants “do the right thing” or
enhance societal wellbeing; and cognitive legitimacy involves the acceptance of an organization’s
legitimacy as inevitable and taken for granted. Moral legitimacy is further subdivided into
consequential legitimacy (does the claimant have righteous goals?), procedural legitimacy (does the
claimant achieve goals righteously?), structural legitimacy (does the claimant take righteous form?),
and personal legitimacy (is the claimant associated with righteous people?).
Tost (2011) expanded Suchman’s (1995) conception into a three-dimensional construct
comprised of instrumental, relational and moral components. Organizations are legitimate when they
(1) “facilitate the individual’s or group’s attempt to reach self-defined or internalized goals or
outcomes,”
(2) “affirm the social identity and self-worth of individuals or social groups and ensure that
individuals or groups are treated with dignity and respect and receive outcomes commensurate
with their entitlement” and
(3) are “consistent with the evaluator’s moral and ethical values” (p. 693-4).
With this in hand, organizations are permitted by their audiences to make mistakes, deviate from social
norms and expectations from time to time, and influence the standards by which stakeholders evaluate
them. Suchman (1995) argues that organizations eventually build cognitive legitimacy, where their
legitimacy is taken for granted and individuals interpret incoming information through a presumption
of legitimacy. Once established, the burden becomes exceedingly high for overcoming that
presumption, requiring a serious challenge to jolt audiences into reassessment (Tost, 2011). Competing
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organizations use mimetic isomorphism in order to obtain legitimacy, shaping themselves in the image
of established agencies and reducing the degree to which existing organizations are subject to challenge
(Suchman, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Legitimacy, then, douses the motivation to give the
attention necessary for heightened scrutiny, acting as an audience sedative (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).
Stretching beyond the confines of social psychological/criminological views of legitimacy, one
finds a world of legitimacy research that support this assumption. Review of core legitimacy theory
across three disciplines – social psychology, organizational management science, and political science
– exposes cross-disciplinary insights that should inform one another. Each of these sciences has a
separate, if complementary, definition of legitimacy. While social psychologists have focused on
legitimacy as primarily a construct of authority-subordinate relationships, organizational management
science has tended to focus on the legitimacy of non-state actor groups and political scientists have
considered national and supranational legitimacy. Culling these bodies of work, has lead me to define
legitimacy as I now see it: Not so much “entitlement to exercise power granted by some collectivelyaccepted origin of authority,” but, rather, something simpler, “the capacity to convince another of
one’s authoritative status, persuasive authority.”
The goal of legitimacy research is to discern what diminishes legitimacy, how that deterioration
may be stopped and reversed, and how authorities can enhance their legitimacy overall and during
specific encounters. In pursuit of that goal, it is crucial to understand how citizens determine whether
authority figures are legitimate or not. By understanding this process more fully, justice researchers
and practitioners may adjust their methods in ways that build legitimacy and avert legitimacy crises.
That legitimation is a process more complex than previously thought has already been alluded to in
criminal justice scholarship but bringing other fields into the discussion further elucidates this notion.
Having now explained how I came to define legitimacy and legitimating processes as I have, I now
turn to explain why I believe there is nuance in who is perceived to be claiming legitimacy.
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Identity in criminal justice research: Who is the “authority”?
In his study on perceptions of police, Harkin (2015) notes, “[L]egitimacy is not just granted in blanket
terms to police as a whole” (p. 604). One of many lingering questions involves how authorities are
seen by those from whom they desire obedience. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) have described
legitimacy as dialogic, a conversational process whereby entities make claims about legitimacy that
claim audiences then evaluate and either accept or reject (see also Nivette, 2014; Hampel & Tracey,
2017). Critical to a deeper understanding of this conversation is considering who is making a legitimacy
claim and what they are claiming is legitimate. From the perceiver’s standpoint, there is a question of
who is perceived to be making a claim and what that claim is perceived to be about.
In defining what constitutes “members of political systems,” Easton (1965) makes a
distinction between “authorities” and “regimes,” the former referring to people in authority at any
given moment and the later to the system of rules and institutions under which these people govern
that remains in place even as individual leaders come and go. Legitimacy and trust confer specific
support upon authorities, short-lived and utility-based, while regimes enjoy longer-term diffuse
support. His work has been explored in the police setting (Zhao & Ren, 2014) and presaged later
discussions within criminal justice circles of law legitimacy versus police legitimacy (Cherney &
Murphy, 2013), though Easton’s view of “regime” extends more broadly to a distinction between
government legitimacy and legitimacy of the current government administration. The justice system
is associated with government and its systems, as well as the legal regime that organizes governing
administrations, suggesting that both influence the social identity of justice officials.
In management science, organizational legitimacy dominates legitimation discourse, which
might inform how justice legitimacy researchers account for the organizational and managerial aspects
of legal authorities’ claims to legitimacy. Management scholars have endeavored to show how
legitimation happens in organizations who make legitimacy claims to a multitude of outside audiences
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and to internal audiences such as staff and managers to themselves (Suchman, 1995). Importantly,
they have proposed that organizations may engage in mimetic isomorphism, clothing themselves in
the broader legitimacy of an industry standard (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), as well as seek ways to
distinguish themselves from industry competitors by claiming greater commitment to socially
acceptable norms and values (Hampel & Tracey, 2017). Criminal justice research supports a similar
process at work on perceptions of justice officials. Police officers may benefit from being seen as
distinct from other system actors. Tyler (2004) highlights that police often receive the highest ratings
of any criminal justice actors, with a 2002 National Institute of Justice survey finding that fifty-nine
percent of those polled had “a great deal” of confidence in the police. In the same study, only twentyseven percent of respondents expressed the same degree of confidence in the CJS. Likewise, a 1998
General Social Survey found that only twenty-two percent of the public had great confidence in the
judiciary. While generally lower than whites, African American respondents, overall, showed
comparable level of dissatisfaction with the CJS relative to police. Citizens not only are capable but
do make distinction between police and other criminal justice roles.
It is another question whether individual justice officials are viewed as distinct individuals or
as mere prototypes of their agencies. Law enforcement agents are believed to typify the majority mores
and social sentiments of the society in which they govern, particularly in a democratic society where
government and laws are thought to reflect the people. An officer’s identity as representative of state
grant what Suchman (1995) calls cognitive legitimacy, legitimacy that comes with a certain degree of
taken-for-grantedness (Tyler, 2004; Miles-Johnson, 2013; Sykes & Clark, 1975; Kirk & Matsuda, 2011).
Police officers serve as living symbols of the law and on-street instruments of the CJS (Sykes & Clark,
1975). Officers are viewed as the primary control mechanism of society and, as such, their personal
identities are often conflated with their identity as an embodiment of the societal will (Gau et al., 2012).
Thus, the actions of police officers signify individuals’ value and place within the larger society, and
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thus expectations of fair treatment might be low among the marginalized who understand society’s
low regard for their social group (Tyler, 2004; Tankebe, 2009; Gau et al., 2012; Dai et al., 2011; Wells,
2007). When an officer makes a decision regarding whether a crime has occurred, how to resolve a
dispute, or how to investigate crime, it is assumed that she is acting within the dictates of law and that
any criticism of their actions may well be seen as challenging the legal regime. Tyler (1990) showed
that police legitimacy, though separate, does have a reciprocal relationship to legal legitimacy (Tyler &
Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2004).
Research has also shown that a person’s attitude toward an individual police officers is often
shaped by their prior “global” attitude about police in general (Gau et al., 2012; Brunson & Gau, 2015;
Dai et al., 2011; Gau & Brunson, 2010; Braga et al., 2014). Braga et al. (2014) found that previous
experiences with the police tended to shape a global perception which, in turn, shaped views of new
interactions with other officers. As one interacts with individuals seen as prototypical of a social group,
such an outcome is to be expected. Moreover, after priming subjects with a description of the general
climate of police-community relations, this information significantly influenced later perceptions of
individual police action. Mazerolle et al. (2013b) reported a statistically significant path from
perceptions of legitimacy in a specific encounter with an officer to those of the greater police
profession. According to Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2017) how this information is received is highly
influenced by one’s racial social group, with racial differences heightening the likelihood that
individuals will be seen as racial prototypes. Sykes and Clark (1975) found that, even where prejudice
did not exist, minority citizens might be more likely to attribute the assertion of authority by a White
officer as indicative of the officer’s claim to superiority due to her race (see also Brunson & Gau 2015).
Cherney and Murphy’s (2011) study found that, among minority participants, procedural justice had
an overall detrimental effect on willingness to cooperate, hypothesized as due to profound enmity
toward the legitimacy of the law. Cherney and Murphy supported their findings with those of
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Braithwaite (2009), who also found that procedural justice is ineffectual for those who see regulatory
authority as illegitimate.
However, within the organizational sciences, Suchman has argued that “the perception that
charismatic individuals can transcend and reorder established routines often allows organizations to
dodge potentially stigmatizing events” (1995, p. 582), and offers personal legitimacy as a construct. A
growing scholarship in informal leadership supports this notion (Miner, 2013). Braga et al. (2014)
found that knowledge of an officer’s prior work history had a substantial effect on a respondent’s
perception of a police contact. Dai, Frank and Sun (2011) also confirm that citizens react differently
to different officers, especially influenced by demographic differences or similarities (p. 164; see Meier
& Nicholson-Crotty, 2006, p. 851). For example, Harkin (2015) showed that citizens viewed
community policing officers, as a unit, different (and more positively) than patrol officers or others.
Schulhofer, Tyler and Huq (2011) discovered that perceptions of fairness in policy formation had a
differential impact on the willingness of Muslim Americans to alert police to terror plots versus the
willingness to work with police on anti-terror initiatives. They suggest that these differences reflect a
distinction between local officers with whom the community has a relationship and the overarching
CJS. Here, citizens may be more acquiescent to working on anti-terror activities with specific
neighborhood officers than turning offenders in to a system they view as inimical to them. In
researching the influence of deference expectations in police-citizen encounters, Sykes and Clark
(1975) note that an officer’s membership in a particular racial or ethnic group could influence whether
they are seen as distinct from the general body of police officers (see also Dai et al., 2011). Racial traits,
gender, age, size and officer demeanor all contribute to a citizen’s attribution of individual legitimacy
to a specific authority figure. For the young Black males in Gau and Brunson’s (2006) study, a Black
face in uniform might do much to ease their concerns of abuse – a view not without support
(Antonovics & Knight, 2009).
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Representative bureaucracy theory advocates that agencies should have a workforce roughly
representative of the community it serves. Supposedly, this leads to greater understanding of diverse
populations within a public agency and greater equality of treatment for residents (Lasley et al., 2011).
This happens as a result of two processes, passive and active representation (Meier & Nicholson-Crotty,
2006). Passive representation is the mere presence of diversity within a workforce. From this, several
benefits might arise. First, officers will be in contact with officers of different demographic
backgrounds, which should sensitize them to gender, racial or cultural variances (Meier & NicholsonCrotty, 2006; Lasley et al., 2011). Contact is seen as a strategy to bridge social boundaries. Meier and
Nicholson-Crotty (2006) observed that, as male officers interacted more with female officers, they
became more sensitive to the concerns of the female gender, female victimization especially. Colvin
(2009) notes that greater exposure to gays and lesbians tends to result in greater acceptance of
homosexuals and their lifestyles. In addition, residents may begin to take ownership of an agency if
they feel vicariously included in it through representation by a member of their demographic.
Moreover, representative bureaucracy may act as a signal to individuals who perceive themselves an
outgroup that they are, in fact, included. For those who are marginalized, there may even be a yearning
for this outcome. In societies where racial divides are deep and minority interests are seen as at odds
with those of the majority population, respondents tend to want the local police force to have a racially
representative mix (Brunson & Gau, 2015; Lasley et al., 2011; for a parallel concerning gender, see
Miles-Johnson, 2013; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). I should note, though, that the effectiveness
of this strategy has been called into question by numerous studies (e.g., Ozkan et al., 2016; NicholsonCrotty et al., 2017), and clear-cut and publicized examples of officers’ explicit racial representation in
practice are few (see Lim, 2006; though New York Police Department sergeant Edwin Raymond is
one example).
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Social identity theory suggests that how one views herself or himself, as well as how one views
others, is anything but simplistic. Instead, individuals perceive themselves and others as a hodgepodge
of identities, categorizing them and ascribing prototypical characteristics of whatever group
membership is most salient in the moment (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This is a naturally occurring
human inclination, used to make order of an oft chaotic social world and to orient oneself in relation
to others in the social realm. It is unlikely that criminal justice officials escape this psychological
process. The foregoing review of how identity has figured in criminal justice research demonstrates
that industry and organizational associations, intergroup relations within societies and personal
identity are all salient to how officials are perceived by those they encounter. In the following section,
I briefly review social identity theory and place this work in theoretical context.

Conceptualizing social identity
Self-consciousness arises the moment a sentient being realizes her own existence as separate and apart
from that of others – thereby engaging in a first act of both self- and social categorization. Owing to
its assumed centrality in identity formation (Jenkins, 2000), there is now an impressive literature laying
out the process of self-categorization first identified in Tajfel’s (1972) social identity theory, such that
this line of inquiry has developed into a theory in its own right (i.e. Turner et al., 1987). Ingroup
identification occurs when an individual recognizes similarities between themselves and the defining
features of a group, and self-categorization involves that individual then defining herself as a member
of that group (Hogg & Turner, 1985). People internalize the norms of their group and seek to bring
their behavior in line with those norms (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), depersonalizing and imitating what
they perceive to be group prototypes (Turner et al., 1994; Haslam et al., 1999). By doing so, I can now
also determine what is most appropriate for me to do in a given situation. Tests of social identity
theory have confirmed group identification as a powerful predictor of individual attitudes, finding that
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ingroup values determine individual values (Price, 1989; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Gwinner & Swanson,
2003; Boduszek et al., 2013).
Much less has been written about the subtleties in how we categorize others, though this is an
equally important process. Social categorization, categorizing others into socially meaningful groups,
is endemic to human interaction and is a critical aspect of social processes (Jenkins, 2000; Hogg &
Reid, 2006), including legitimation. Claims to legitimacy are direct appeals for being categorized as an
authority worthy of respect or deference (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Nivette, 2014). Understanding
this clarifies legitimation for the theorist and, for the practitioner, may lead to strategies for
strengthening those claims. While social categorization implicates processes well beyond legitimation,
how authorities obtain legitimacy is an opportune place to start.
Human beings must find ways to simplify our complex world in order to make judgments
about how the world works and how best to react to it (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017). Given this
reality, Jenkins (2000) writes, “All human knowledge is dependent upon classification” (p. 7). Tajfel
(1969) identified social categorization as our way of coping with this need, developing identifying
groups and their prevailing stereotypes so that the thousands of individuals we may encounter can be
reduced to a much smaller set of overarching collectives. According to social identity theorists,
developing humans refine their categorization over time, identifying an increasing variety of groups
and placing those groups within two broad categories: an ingroup (to which they belong) and an
outgroup containing those who are different (Jenkins, 2000). The most basic finding of social identity
theory is that individuals are defined by their group membership, their identities formed as amalgams
of numerous group-based prototypes, satisfying a need to belong that encourages bringing their
behavior in-line with what is expected of their group (Turner et al., 1979; Brewer, 1991).

20 | P a g e

As with my own group, by developing expectations for the motives, attitudes and behaviors of
prototypical members of other groups, I can predict your behavior by what I might expect from your
group’s prototype (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017).
Identity theorists – including those in the social identity tradition – not only recognize but
highlight that the social world is not comprised of a monolithic ingroup or outgroup. Individuals
perceive themselves to be members of multiple ingroups, which may or may not cleanly overlap
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Fitzsimmons (2013) outlines several conditions impacting the likelihood
that an individual with multiple identities will integrate them into a cohesive whole or maintain them
as distinct. In the latter case, situational context tends to drive which of these identities becomes
important – a phenomenon termed identity salience (Haslam et al., 1999; Hogg & Terry, 2000). Salience
can trigger wide shifts in what is prescribed by social identity. For example, Bell (2016) documents
how Black mothers in the District of Columbia dropped their usual adversarial orientation to police
in order to receive the assistance to protect their children. Bell explained this dichotomy as “domain
specificity,” arguing that trust is granted to authorities on a case-by-case basis dependent on the
situation at hand, though it may equally be explained as identity-choice (e.g., mother versus police
antagonist) in response to situational saliency.
Despite a fieldwide focus centering self-categorization and the importance of ingroups, recent
scholars have also noted that the theory’s relevance in explaining intergroup conflict lie, in equal part,
in how it explains the perception of outgroups. Building on initial suggestions by Ashforth and Mael
(1989), Korschun (2015) highlights that membership is perceived and, like all perceptions, may be
adjusted to account for problematic realities. In his work, Korschun argues that ingroup members
(say, employees of an organization) may construe ingroup membership for a person who’s ties to the
group are potentially questionable (e.g., a committed customer might be construed as a member of
the organizational in-group – a “member of the family” – or technically an outgroup member).
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According to Korschun, membership is construed when individuals’ values align with the ingroup,
there is a long-term or committed relationship, and when there is little threat to the group by the
individuals’ inclusion.
Theorists coming from the social identity perspective also highlighted how group identity
interacts with personal identity (see Fitzsimmons, 2013). Brewer (1991) proposes a theory of optimal
distinctiveness, suggesting that individuals identify in a way that best allows for a degree of
distinctiveness while also being included. Thus, in situations where group differences make social
identity salient, depersonalization is most likely to occur and group prototypical behavior more likely
to predominate. In such cases, group inclusion is relied upon to provide the individual pride and selfesteem necessary for contentment (see Haslam et al., 2001). However, in situations where this is not
the case – say, during intragroup interactions – personal identity should play a bigger role in
determining behavior. There are myriad ways that group difference might be made less salient, some
of which might be manipulated by the individual. First, the mere existence of group difference does
not make group membership a salient feature of an encounter (Brewer, 2001). Additional motivation
is needed, typically the perception of a threat against the group, or against the individual based on
group-membership.
Roberts (2005) presents a process of social recategorization, through which individuals make
intentional efforts to recast how they are seen by others. In decategorization, individuals make
“attempts to avoid categorization altogether by deemphasizing one’s social identities and encouraging
others to classify oneself on the basis of personal, individuating characteristics rather than group
memberships” (Roberts, 2005, p. 696). On the other hand, a strategy embracing positive
distinctiveness involves “claiming one’s social identity while attempting to create a positive social
meaning for that identity” (Roberts, 2005, p. 696; see Chattopadhyay et al.’s (2004) review of social
creativity). Chattopadhyay and his colleagues (2004) add to these by detailing strategies of social mobility
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(forsaking one’s ingroup for another) and social competition (improving the standing of one’s ingroup
in comparison with another along metrics important to that other). Miles-Johnson (2016) suggests
that influential, third-party others can also be instrumental in an individual’s group membership being
made less salient in the eyes of another. The influence of leaders in shaping how their ingroup
members view others has been noted in the past (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Even where the outgroup
individual does not actively seek recategorization, constructive and positive contact with outgroup
members reduces the salience of group difference (Cuhadar & Dayton, 2011). Once group difference
is deemphasized, individuals can focus on personal connections to build relationships outside the
framework of intergroup dynamics.
In short, individuals’ understanding of their own identity is complex. In the following section,
I outline how the general concepts put forward in social identity theory have been used to outline the
profess of legitimation.

How, then, does social identity influence legitimacy?
Legitimation refers to “the process by which legitimacy is procured” (von Haldenwang, 2017, p. 270)
and has been described as dialogic, comprised of communication in reaction to others (Bottoms &
Tankebe, 2012; Lowrey-Kinberg & Buker, 2017; Nix et al., 2020) – “the dialogic model” of authorityaudience relations). Claims to legitimacy initiate a cycle of response between authorities and their
audiences wherein the former claims a right to deference and the latter then evaluate and either accept
or reject those claims. Legitimation occurs when audiences accept claims to legitimacy (Blount-Hill,
2020). According to previous theorists, acceptance of an authority’s claim to legitimacy involves an
act of social categorization, revealing the audience’s view of the claimant as part of a social group
having moral right to deference (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Blader, 2000).
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Tyler’s (1988) procedural justice paradigm has formed the cornerstone for current research on
legal legitimacy (e.g., Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Murphy & Tyler, 2008; Jackson et
al., 2010; Mazerolle et al., 2013a; Meares et al., 2015). Procedural justice concerns “the manner in
which authorities exercise their authority” (Tyler, 2003, p. 286) and results when individuals believe
that manner is fair. Tyler’s body of work has explained two primary ways by which social identity leads
to judgments of legitimacy, mediated through procedural justice (de Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Bradford
et al., 2015). The group value model (GVM) holds that group norms and values shape those of its
individual members and that members will follow others in deferring to leaders commonly seen as
legitimate (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Under the group engagement model (GEM), authorities signal to
individuals that they are members of the same ingroup through procedurally fair and respectful
treatment, and this encourages the individual to adhere to group norms of obedience (Tyler & Blader,
2000). I previously summarized this way:
The causal chain [put forward in the GVM] is thus (a) self-categorization and identification as
an ingroup member to (b) concern about ingroup standing (group identity salience) to (c)
social categorization of authorities as ingroup authorities to (d) affirmation of ingroup status
by ingroup authorities’ respectful treatment to (e) motivation to maintain ingroup standing by
accepting its authorities’ legitimacy to (f) adherence to group norm of compliance with its
authorities …. Resituating the aforementioned causal chain, the GEM posits a sequence
beginning with (a) social categorization of authorities as members of some group to (b)
authorities’ respectful treatment signaling their social categorization of the individual as a
member of the ingroup to (c) acceptance of authorities’ social categorization, self-categorizing
as ingroup member to (d) identification with the ingroup to (e) motivation to maintain ingroup
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standing by accepting its authorities’ legitimacy to (f) adherence to group norm of compliance
with its authorities (Blount-Hill, 2020, p. 4-5).2
Recent studies revisiting the social identity foundations in Tyler’s work have coalesced around
the GEM as a primary model. Bradford, Murphy and Jackson (2014) found the connection between
procedurally just treatment and improved legitimacy judgments was explained by respondents’ social
identity as citizens, supporting a GEM. Bradford (2014) showed that procedural justice was especially
important in signaling shared group membership to those with more tenuous connection to the
national ingroup, e.g., immigrants. In subsequent work, Bradford and colleagues (2015) present
findings suggesting that deference to the law borne of procedural justice in policing may, in fact, be
explained by people’s conformity to the expectations of social ingroups to the exclusion of an
obligation or moral alignment with police on the part of the individual (conferatur Madon et al., 2017;
Sargeant et al., 2016). Accepting the GEM, Radburn and colleagues (2018) introduced the concept of
relational identification, wherein individuals may recognize the police as a group to which they do not
belong, nonetheless have such affinity for law enforcement that they evince “ingroup” bias for police,
especially as against marginalized outgroups (cf. Korschun’s (2015) complementary concept of
construed membership).
A serious gap in the criminal justice literature on legal authorities and legitimation remains
regarding encounters with individuals who perceive justice officials as members of an outgroup. Both
the GEM and GVM assume common group membership between authorities and supposed
subordinates. If they model the only means by which authorities acquire legitimacy, alternative

While competing definitions of legitimacy have less clearly rooted their theories in social identity theory and proposed
mechanisms of legitimation in addition to procedural justice (e.g., Huq et al., 2017; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012), it is also
not certain that these exclude a social identity explanation. For example, in the causal linkages from social identity to
compliance, one might argue for simply substituting procedural justice with distributive justice, police effectiveness,
legality, or bounded authority. One might incorporate Jackson et al.’s (2012) definition of legitimacy as normative
alignment into social identity merely by specifying this means alignment with group norms for both the authority and
subordinate.
2
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theorizing is needed for encounters between criminal justice officials and members of subordinate
outgroups. Two theoretical pathways exist but are underexplored. One is an expanded legitimation
theory including the full social identity framework. Early social identity theorists focused their
attention on encounters between outgroups (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). How is legitimation
modified in this circumstance?
Heuer and Stroessner (2011) proposed a multi-value model in which authorities’ procedurally
just treatment signals respect for outgroup individuals and the standing of their outgroup. Applying
their model, individuals (a) self-categorize and identify as an ingroup member, (b) are concerned about
their ingroup’s standing with others, (c) categorize authorities as outgroup members, (d) look for
affirmation of their ingroup’s status by outgroup authorities’ respectful treatment and (e) maintain
ingroup standing by complying with outgroup authorities. Heuer and Stroessner find that procedural
justice is more important for individuals to accept authorities’ decisions in intergroup encounters than
in intragroup encounters, a finding supported by previous studies outside of criminal justice (Ståhl et
al., 2004). However, Ståhl et al. (2008) also find that the impact of procedural justice on legitimacy is
mediated by whether outgroup authorities are expected to be fair or not. According to Ståhl et al’s
(2008) findings, where authorities are assumed to be biased towards the ingroup, outgroup members
base their reactions on the justness of outcomes and not procedures (a concern described by the
concept of distributive justice). Another mediating factor is whether the individual encountered by an
outgroup authority strongly or only weakly identifies with their ingroup; in cases where ingroup
identification is weaker for the individual in question, she or he is less likely to be influenced by
authorities’ perceived respect for their ingroup via procedural justice (Ståhl et al., 2006).
Heuer, Ståhl, and their colleagues’ work suggests the need for additional models outside of
Tyler’s GVM (Lind & Tyler, 1988) or GEM (Tyler & Blader, 2000). The group value/engagement
models apply when individuals highly identify with their ingroup and encounter ingroup authorities.
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A separate model is needed to explain what happens with individuals highly identify with their ingroup
and encounter outgroup authorities. An additional model may be needed to explain when individuals
encounter outgroup authorities but only weakly identify with a salient ingroup. Still further, we need
to explain how these differ where the outgroup authority is expected to be biased. Put another way, a
comprehensive social identity theory of legitimation requires explaining three stages in the process:
(1) categorizing the authority as ingroup or outgroup; (2) expecting the authority to be fair or biased;
and (3) strongly or weakly identifying with a salient ingroup.
Legal cynicism is described as belief that “the law and its agents are either ineffective or
derelict” (see Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Bell, 2016), a cultural phenomenon rather than merely a personal
one, wherein social group norms encourage “distrust in the motives of the legal system and belief that
it is not a reliable resource” (Blount-Hill, 2020; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Carr et al., 2007; Kirk &
Papachristos, 2011). It encapsulates the idea that the law and its agents are either ineffective or derelict
in their mission to protect and maintain order, or, worse, are operating under a more sinister mission
of oppression. Seeing the law as illegitimate, legal cynics – which may include entire populations in
the most vulnerable communities – do not prioritize compliance with the law, nor do they utilize law
enforcement for protection or conflict resolution. Bell (2017) goes further. She explicitly puts forward
a model suggesting a combination of procedural injustice, vicarious marginalization, and structural
exclusion cause deep-rooted legal cynicism, which, existing side-by-side with its causes, creates an
overarching state of legal estrangement. Importantly, Bell positions her theoretical proposition in
opposition to, or at least in critique of, Tyler’s (1998) procedural justice paradigm and presents it as
more culture theory (in the vein of Shweder & LeVine, 1984) than social psychology, jettisoning any
mention of roots in Tajfel’s (1972) social identity theory. However, her proposal explains how
authorities are perceived when they are assumed to be biased against an individual’s ingroup, i.e. legal
cynicism, and there is high ingroup identification (e.g., as suggested by her conceptualization of
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vicarious marginalization). Seen this way, despite her disavowals of the legitimacy paradigm, Bell’s
work provides perhaps the most complete example of a model explaining legitimation, albeit only one
of its pathways and for only one subset of perceivers.

Structural symbolic interactionist identity theory
As an alternative to psychology’s social identity theory, sociology’s identity theory posits that individual
identities are centered on roles; the self-conscious sentient comes to understand a relationship with
others in which she is obliged to behave a certain way that complements (though rarely replicates) the
equally obligatory roles of others. Obligations are linked to specific roles, and individuals discern
appropriate behavior by referencing what is expected of their roles.
Stryker’s (1980) theory of structural symbolic interactionism, building on his earlier work
(Stryker, 1968), proposes that individuals understand their identities as role based. In a reflection of
(hu)man’s place in Durkheim’s (1893/1997) modern society structured around role specialization,
Stryker explained that people’s identity is based on their perceived roles in a structured social setting.
Roles are positions that carry a set of expectations for behavior designed to work in concert with
other, different roles as a way of achieving order in social life (Stets & Burke, 2000). Roles are socially
dictated (e.g., in defining what a “mother is”) or otherwise negotiated in interactions with others (e.g.,
in defining the less clear expectations of maternal derivatives, such as “godmothers” or
“stepmothers”). The process of role-definition and role-choice is an iterative, dialogic one, with others
assigning individuals to a role, individuals accepting or rejecting that role, perhaps offering to take on
another role or to alter the one assumed, and on and on, mostly implicitly without express discussion
between parties (Stryker, 2007). Role assumption helps one to define themselves by committing the
individual to a set of behavioral expectations attached to the role and by clarifying counterroles, which
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may be complementary or opposing, the contours of which highlight boundaries between what is
expected of one and what is expected of another.
There is some debate as to the relationship between Stryker’s (1980) SSI – what, in
microsociology, has come to be called, simply, identity theory – and Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) social
identity theory, but the general consensus is that there is room for integration. Social identity theory
originated from studies of intergroup relations and role-based identity theory from investigating
intragroup interactions. Hogg, Terry and White (1995) point out that each focus on a different level
of analysis, both important to the formation of social identity. According to these social identity
theorists, role-based theory better explains interactions at the intragroup, interpersonal level, while
social identity theory is better suited for intergroup explanations. Other than their role- versus groupbased theories of identity formation, the actual psychological process they delineate is quite similar
(Stets & Burke, 2000). Both give an explanation tying individual identity to socially-constructed
groupings (either role or social group), both suppose that individual is both assigned and selects this
grouping in an interactional process with others in their social network, and both suppose that
individuals depersonalize and take on the expectations of that role or group as a general guide for
behavior.
Another commonality is their theorizing of individuals’ self-perceptions, with much less
attention given to the complexity of how others are perceived and categorized. While social identity
theory recognizes the existence of multiple outgroups, relatively little work in this area focuses on how
the outgroup to which another is assigned influences how that other is seen. Likewise, SSI describes
roles as they relate to the perceiver, but not how the perceiver sees others’ roles as relating to each
other. However, Stets and Burke (2000), leading identity theorists, call for more: “A complete theory
of the self would consider both role and the group bases of identity as well as identities based in the
person that provide stability across groups, roles, and situations” (p. 234). To my already multilayered
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presentation of identity, I add one more in the following section, reviewing the basic ideas coming
from narrative identity theory.

Narrative identity and the role of cultural master narratives
Claims to authority are indeed dialogic and discursive, yet all social interactions take place in a narrative
context. Claims of legitimate authority, then, are narrative: They are opening attempts at framing
interactions between supposed authorities and their subordinates to fit within longer running
narratives justifying that authority. Responses to those claims, likewise, do not flow sua sponte, but
are organized as plot points fit into the narratives of audience members whose life stories may well
contain prefigured character roles for those authorities seeking legitimacy and prescribe a given
reaction. How I react and behave in discourses of claimed authority is heavily influenced by my own
story of self, my narrative identity. Central to the discursive process is meaning making, how an
individual interprets and comprehends the external world both sensorily and semiotically, and
questions of this sort are the basis of narrative study (Bauer et al., 2008; Adler et al., 2017).
Storytelling is the means by which we bind our personal selves to the various groups that give
us definition, tie our individual experience with those of important others, and connect our present to
our past and to our future (Smith et al., 2017). The narrative understanding of what has transpired and
what is to come, what links and what divides, is central to how we perceive connection to the temporal
world and all in it, including our social ingroups (McAdams & McLean, 2013).
Narrative may be defined as “a temporally ordered statement concerning events experienced
by and/or actions of one or more protagonists” (Presser, 2009, p. 178) and storytelling as the act of
communicating narrative to another. In recent decades, criminologists have explored life narrative as
a crucial site for theorization and innovative intervention for criminal offenders (Presser, 2009;
Dickinson & Wright, 2017; Denver & Ewald, 2018), contributing to the “narrative turn” seen across
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social sciences (Presser, 2016). While criminologists have tended to approach narrative identity in view
of how the individual frames their relationship to society (e.g., Ward & Marshall, 2007), personality
psychologists have focused on how individuals shape their personal life narratives (e.g., McAdams,
1995). Kate McLean has been particularly important in bridging this divide. According to McLean,
people frame their stories of self by drawing heavily from cultural master narratives, prescribed
templates personalized by individuals to derive acceptable life stories (McLean, 2008).
Life stories are defined as “a selective narrative of one’s past experiences and thoughts about
those experiences that serves to integrate the self” (McLean, 2008, p. 1686), and a narrative identity is
“an internalized and evolving story of the self that a person constructs in order to make sense of the
remembered past, experienced present, and imagined future” (McAdams et al., 2013, p. 202). In his
theory of narrative identity, individuals spend their life course attempting to construct meaning
through reflecting on themselves and composing a chronological story of “me” (McAdams, 1985;
2013). Life narratives contain all the usual components of a story, including a beginning (the
individual’s origin story, so to speak) and an end (the individual’s aspiration of a future self). What fills
the space between these bookends is the story of how the person at present emerged from her
historical past.
McAdams (1985) has put forward a telling of identity in which one understands herself along
three dimensions, in chronology. According to McAdams, individual identity is indeed heavily
impacted by idiosyncratic traits and characteristics of a person that remain largely stable over time, as
well as sets of goals and motivations that drive short-term and long-term behaviors, but these
collections of at-times-stable, at-times-shifting elements of self are given cohesive form not by group
or by role, but rather by narrative. Together, those idiosyncrasies and motivations comprise
developmental layers one and two of the self, from which layer three, narrative identity, draws and to
which it feeds back. Personalities (the “I”) see themselves (“me”) as comprised of a bundle of
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dispositional traits (level 1; e.g., shy or energetic) and individual motivations (level 2; e.g., goals and
values), with an overarching, historical life narrative (level 3; i.e. how I came to be, who I am now, and
where I shall go). McAdams (2013) suggests that social roles and group identities, along with unique
dispositional traits, are layer one traits, determining the social, psychological and societal resources
and limitations at hand as an individual navigates as a social actor, and inform what possibilities there
are for the individual as a motivated agent and narrative author.
McAdams’s theory describes how one comes to know herself but has only tacitly been
described as specifying how we understand others. McAdams (1995) illustrates how it might be used
to explain the understanding of others through personal anecdote, but, to my knowledge, has centered
his work mostly on how narrative identity informs self-definition. Still, essential components of a
narrative include supporting characters whose roles must be understood and accounted for as the
author writes her story, and McAdams’s formulation might be used to identify the sources by which
individuals find similarity in outgroup individual others.
McLean explicitly ties personal narrative to larger cultural narratives. She explains how
individual life stories are oft crafted to fit general templates prescribed by the norms of cultural
ingroups with which individuals identify, i.e. biographical master narratives (McLean et al., 2018). The
templates of individual life stories emerge as ways to incorporate, at the individual level, how one is
expected to experience the collective narrative of the ingroup. Master narratives are “culturally shared
stories that provide frameworks within which individuals can locate and story their own experiences”
(McLean et al., 2018, p. 633), “prevailing cultural storylines that emphasize or even require particular
ways of being, acting, or feeling” (Kerrick & Henry, 2017, p. 2). One way that cultural templates evince
themselves in the personal stories of individuals is through enculturating preferred themes, “recurrent,
goal-directed sequences in life narratives” (Bauer et al., 2008, p. 85). For example, the “redemptive
self” – one delivered from suffering to a positive affective state, finding fulfillment and growth after
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setback – has been shown to be a powerful theme often occurring and emphasized in the life narratives
of American respondents (Pals & McAdams, 2004; McAdams & Guo, 2015). Common themes
emerging from a review of narrative studies include motivational themes like agency, communion and
growth, or affective ones including redemption but also contamination and positive resolution (Adler
et al., 2017).
Studies connecting narrative identity to well-being have found that key to this connection is
the role narrators assign to others in their stories of personal growth and development – what becomes
a process then of communal growth (Bauer et al., 2008). Part of this is likely due to the psychological
well-being that comes from belonging to a group (Hunter et al., 2004; Lorenzo-Hernández &
Ouellette, 1998). The majority of individuals craft life stories consistent with the “canonical narrative,”
that is the normative template for how one’s life should unfurl given the context of the cultural master
narrative in which the life events occur (McLean, 2008). Where this does not happen, however,
individuals often find their stories, their voices, and their individual selves rejected, disapproved or
ignored (McLean et al., 2018). One might expect this fate to be particularly damning for those who
highly identify with their ingroups and, subsequently, whose well-being is more strongly tied to their
connection to ingroup others.
As narrative research has gained credence across social sciences, criminal justice research and
practice has been transformed by an ever-growing interest in the psychology of justice and processes
of legitimation drawing primarily from social psychology’s social identity theory (e.g., O’Brien et al.,
2019; Radburn et al., 2018; Hamm et al., 2017). The master narrative becomes a critical convergence
point in these expanding – yet separate – theoretical discourses. A person’s self-narrative guides
actions that may be important to their social group, such as criminal activity or compliance with the
law, and that narrative is constructed in reference to the repertoire of acceptable narratives recognized
within that group (McLean & Syed, 2015). Understanding master narratives as the definitive tool by
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which cultural norms shape how individuals understand and convey their life stories is then powerfully
important to interpreting the qualitative statements individuals make regarding their relationships to
legal authorities, a major and growing area of legitimacy studies. For those hailing from cultures whose
master narratives position legal authorities as being members of an antagonistic outgroup, their
perceptions of authorities may be seen as instantiations of wider held narrative canons expected to be
especially prominent among those identifying strongly with the ingroup. For those seeking to
understand delegitimation/legal estrangement models such as Bell’s (2017) it is critical then to
understand how these master narratives are used to make meaning of individual events to shape the
role of legal authorities in the life stories of outgroup subordinates.

In sum
Integrating social identity theory, structural symbolic interactionist theory, and narrative identity
theory might provide a pathway to the “complete theory of self” that Stets and Burke (2000) called
for and more detailed theorization of how we view others. I hypothesize that audiences perceive
various “spheres” of identity – dimensions of identity including one’s group identity, role identity, and
personal narrative identity – and these interact to create a complex calculus of authorities’ legitimacy.
A comprehensive theory of legitimation must account for the influence of audiences’ (1)
categorization of authorities as ingroup or outgroup; (2) expectations of fairness or bias; and (3) degree
of identification with their salient ingroup. I have done some initial exploration of this latter aspect in
forthcoming work; in the subsequent study, I explore the first and second. Using quantitative analyses
of survey responses and applying social identity and SSI lenses, I examine how an authority’s being
categorized as either ingroup or outgroup resource impacts the positivity or nature of legitimacy
judgments about the criminal justice system, and then explore how social group identity influences
perceptions of procedural justice, a construct closely tied to legitimation as noted above. Having
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gained initial insights in how social categorization and expectations of fairness shape perceptions of
legitimacy and procedural justice, I turn to qualitative analysis. While my survey data measures
perceived bias (versus fairness) of CJS actors, it does not reveal how these perceptions came to be
from a social group perspective. Thus, I use narrative identity as a lens to analyze how respondents
talk about their experiences with police to detect whether pre-existing cultural narrative scripts explain
their interpretations of events.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH
My own background as a patrol officer inspired this research. I served as a police officer for the City
of Charleston, South Carolina. Assigned to a high-minority, relatively high-crime and economically
depressed portion of the city where police legitimacy was low, I often relied on aspects of my personal
history with residents and racial group identity. In other circumstances, particularly in higher
socioeconomic, non-minority areas where my background was, in fact, a hindrance, I found that I
emphasized other aspects of my identity to garner respect or connect. Stories from veteran officers
also helped to fuel interest in this area. I recall a former correctional officer recounting when, during
a mass disruption in his facility, inmates familiar with his style of supervision locked him in a closet
for safety, a seeming nod to personal legitimacy.
While anecdote can be valuable, demonstrable, replicable evidence of the various aspects of
legitimation provides a meaningful basis for more precise and creative strategies to enhance the
legitimacy of officers and other criminal justice practitioners in the field. This study assists in
generating that evidence. Specifically, I seek the answer the following research questions:
1. Do different social groups assess the legitimacy of criminal justice system (CJS) officials
similarly or differently?
2. Do social groups that view government as an ingroup resource consider an authority figure’s
intragroup role in assessing CJS legitimacy?
3. Is the link between procedural justice and legitimacy mediated by individuals’ ingroup or
outgroup status in relation to the government?
4. Do marginalized outgroups interpret their perceptions of government through collective
frames like cultural master narratives or through individual experiences?
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Study methods
In this study, I utilize data collected from a 2016 study by the Center for Court Innovation (CCI). CCI
is a criminal justice-focused non-profit, located in New York, New York, that pilots and evaluates
justice-related policy and programming (http://www.courtinnovation.org/). From approximately
May until December of 2016, CCI gathered primary data in support of a study of procedural justice
at work in the criminal justice system (CJS)s of Newark, New Jersey and Cleveland, Ohio (Swaner et
al., 2018). The purpose of the original study was to measure resident perceptions of procedurally just
practice by police, the court system, and correctional agencies. The study was funded by the Bureau
of Justice Assistance (BJA). Most legitimacy studies focus on general populations, but CCI’s study
would be novel in that it would present the viewpoints of those most impacted by the behaviors of
justice officials. Data collection consisted of two phases – a survey and a set of qualitative interviews,
both spread across the two cities. The mixed-methods design of the study allowed CCI’s researchers
to quantify perceptions of procedural justice that, while not technically representative, would give city
policymakers some sense of how defendants felt about their experience in the system. While the
surveys could “score” CJS performance, interviews were needed to explain why those scores were as
they were, both via the reported facts of CJS experience across a large segment of similarly situated
respondents and their interpretations of those experiences.
These dual purposes dovetailed nicely with the purposes of the present study. The novelty of
CCI’s sample being exclusively those with criminal justice backgrounds would add to the uniqueness
of virtually any analysis. However, so far as I am aware, no criminal justice studies have sought to
establish empirically distinct social identity groups with a sample for the purposes of exploring
alterations in statistical relationships between legitimacy and related constructs. The most common
methods used in studies of social identity involve multi-item scales measuring the degree of social
identification with a specified ingroup (e.g., Bradford et al., 2015). Therefore, this study would address
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a heretofore un(der)studied dynamic, ingroup versus outgroup, as opposed to individuals along an
identification spectrum. Nonetheless, factor analyses and structural models have gained increasing
currency in current perceptual studies within criminal justice. To conduct these, one needs a larger
sample size and data in quantified form – both the ambit of classic survey studies.
Still, my proposed theoretical framework not only predicts relationships as dictated by social
group categorization, but also presumes that these relationships come to be, at least in part, through
individual interpretations of experience mediated through culturally ingrained narrative scripts. In this
view, cultural master narratives provide scaffolding from which individuals give form to their own
interpretations of life events, ready with familiar and accessible repositories of meaning. The use of
qualitative interviewing was key to capturing this phenomenon for two reasons. First, analyses of
narrative forms and substance requires, first and foremost, narratives. While open-ended surveys or
narrative prompts are perhaps best suited for this purpose in most cases, qualitative interviews provide
space for this type of analysis where closed-ended surveys do not. Second, the semi-structured manner
in which CCI conducted these interviews meant that a lot of material was provided unelicited by the
direct question asked. This meant that stories were often reflective of the salient experiences of the
respondents, not necessarily the prompting of the interviewer. Given the proposal that master
narratives are crucial for the interpretation of individual events, impromptu storytelling gave strength
to the contention that narrative is a core part of the interpretive process for these respondents.

Phase one: Procedural justice survey
In phase one, a team of researchers administered surveys to approximately 400 residents in each city
at the local courthouse. Early on, base sites were expanded to include other locations seen as more
accessible and welcoming to the community, such as local religious institutions and community service
organizations’ offices. In either case, interviewers screened potential respondents to ensure that most
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the population had experience with all three components of the criminal justice system (police, courts,
and corrections). Survey items contained in the survey and interview protocol address respondents’
perceptions of specific encounters with criminal justice officials, their overall perceptions of these
system components, and perception of the law, the justice system, and non-justice government
agencies and officials.
Sampling strategy
This study used a combination of convenience and purposive sampling. In Newark, survey staff
recruited respondents at the municipal court and the sites of various community organizations,
including Newark Community Solutions, New Hope Baptist Church, St. John Church, Greater
Abyssinian Baptist Church, the Newark Conservancy, Rutgers University Project Rise, Newark
Reentry, and Newark Unemployment Services. In Cleveland, recruitment took place at the municipal
court, the Cuyahoga County Court, and various outdoor public spaces. Interviewers were armed with
a standard introduction script:
Hi, my name is [name], and I’m with an organization called Center for Court Innovation. We
are conducting a survey about people’s experiences with the criminal justice system. The
survey will only take 10 to 15 minutes, and it is confidential—I won’t ask you your name, so
please answer honestly; there are no right or wrong answers. Your participation is voluntary.
You can stop at any time and skip any questions. As a thank you for participating, I will give
you a $5 gift card to Dunkin Donuts at the end of the survey. Would you be willing to
participate?
Interviewers then went through a three-part eligibility screening, collecting information about
a potential respondent’s date of birth, residence in either Newark or Cleveland, and whether the
individual was party to an active criminal case. If the individual was over eighteen, lived in either cities
of interest and had either an active case or one that was resolved only within the last two years, the
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person was eligible. At the end of each survey, the interviewer collected demographic information
from the respondent. The team reviewed this information over the course of the study and adjusted
recruitment targets to maintain demographic diversity. While disparity in the population of likely
criminal justice subjects ensured the final sample would be racial and otherwise skewed, adding
purposive targeting to its convenience sampling allowed the CCI team to explore differences in
experience by demographic group. For example, at various points in the study, sampling trends
justified the imposition of a fourth condition that respondents had some carceral experience beyond
initial pre-trial booking.
Sample
Convenience sampling was appropriate for this study, as the team did not have access to information
that would provide the complete population of those having had justice system contact needed to
produce a random sampling frame. Other studies of criminal justice perceptions have used similar
techniques (Allen, 2016; Wu et al., 2012) and, while it does not produce technically generalizable
findings, studies are able to provide the exploratory basis for later explanatory studies. The research
team completed 399 individual surveys from Newark and 408 individual surveys from Cleveland.
Disparity in the population of likely criminal justice subjects ensured the final sample would be racially
and otherwise skewed; 74% identified as non-Hispanic Black and another 10% as Latinx. CCI
purposely sought criminal justice experience; 95% of survey respondents had an arrest history. Mean
age was approximately 38 years, with relative equity between respondent age categories of 18-24, 2535, 36-45, and 45-55. Over half (56%) of the sample had completed high school, 23% had not
completed high school, 5% had a bachelor’s degree, and the remaining had either some college or an
associate degree.
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Survey method
After successfully recruiting respondents, individual researchers, equipped with a standard survey
protocol, obtained verbal and written consent from the individual and began survey administration.
The surveys were composed of 110 items administered in both verbal and written form. The survey
was designed to take fifteen to twenty minutes to complete. At the conclusion of the survey,
respondents earned a gift card containing a credit worth five dollars at Dunkin’ Donuts, a worldwide
baked-goods and coffee chain. The reward was used to recruit potential respondents for participation.
The amount, while considered persuasive enough for a quick interview, was not thought exorbitant
enough to constitute coercion. The study was approved by CCI’s internal Institutional Review Board.
Survey measures
Survey items contained multiple questions regarding the perceived fairness of treatment by police,
court and correctional officials, in addition to the respondents’ general attitudes toward the law. It
uses well-supported, validated measures of legitimacy (Reisig & Mesko 2009) and its correlates,
including general perceptions (Gau & Brunson, 2010) and affect (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) toward the
police, fairness (Janssen et al., 2010), trust (Miles-Johnson, 2013), general procedural justice (Murphy
2009a), specific procedural justice (Tyler et al., 2010), distributive justice (Fondacaro et al., 2002),
satisfaction (Murphy 2009b), cooperation (Tyler et al., 2010), and police performance (Murphy,
2009b). The survey also includes validated measures of community cohesion and collective efficacy
(Brunton-Smith et al., 2018). Most of these items were measured using a five-point Likert scale.
Social categorization of government as ingroup or outgroup authority

Central to this study is understanding the respondent’s perception of her social group’s orientation to
government. I am exploring whether legitimacy and legitimation differs based upon whether the
respondent presumes ingroup membership with criminal justice officials or sees them as members of
a dominant outgroup. While it was not designed to measure respondent social group membership,
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this survey does include an item helpful in discerning this. Social identity studies confirm that
individuals assigned to a group do not necessarily need to feel close to their fellow ingroup members
in order to feel connection and loyalty to the ingroup (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: Chen & Li, 2009;
Goette et al. 2006). This line of literature supports the assumption that the survey’s group of questions
prompting the respondent with “In my neighborhood …” is sufficient to make neighborhood ingroup
membership salient for the respondent. The preceding questions asks, “How do you define your
neighborhood?” making clear the intent to have the respondent focus on their neighborhood ingroup.
Item 15 asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following: “If people need help,
they go to formal government systems, such as the police or elected officials.” I dichotomize responses
to this item to measure whether government is viewed as ingroup authority (1, those who disagree;
234 respondents, approximately 29% of the sample) or outgroup authority (0, those 417 who agree;
52%) – i.e. how the government is socially categorized by the respondent. Approximately nineteen
percent were unsure how to answer this question or failed to respond; these respondents were
removed from subsequent analyses, leaving a sample of 651 respondents.
The survey includes this item as one of many measures of collective efficacy (CE),
conceptualized as “shared expectations about their collective capability to achieve certain ends”
(Sharkey, 2006, p. 830). Collective efficacy necessarily includes both social cohesion and social group
identification (e.g., Huddy, 2003). In my analyses, I use the item to identify those who perceive relying
upon government as a community norm (a prototypical view of government as ingroup) or rather that
government is not seen as a preferred resource (a prototypical view of government as outgroup) (Tajfel
& Turner, 1979; Lind & Tyler, 1988). In the context of a study, group identification does not
necessarily require closeness to fellow ingroup members in order to feel connection and loyalty to the
ingroup (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Goette et al., 2006). Previous studies used simple prompts to make
group identity salient (Ståhl et al., 2004). The survey’s group of questions prompting the respondent
42 | P a g e

with “In my neighborhood …” and the preceding “How do you define your neighborhood?” should
make group membership salient for the respondent. I use this item as a grouping variable (i.e. social
categorizing of government) to explore differences in how individuals measure CJS officials’ legitimacy
when their ingroup norms endorse the reliability of government (as ingroup authority) in times of
trouble or discourage the use of government (as an outgroup authority) as a reliable source of help.3
There was concern regarding the reliability of the suite of CE items given their chronological
and temporal proximity to one another: Responses may reflect acquiescence bias (Savalei & Falk,
2014). The CCI survey, as structured, presented individuals with the categorization item along with
the other CE questions all using the same scale and all worded to make strong agreement (“5”) a
generally positive response and strong disagreement (“1”) a negative one. Acquiescence bias is best
avoided by changing either the negative-versus-positive connotation of some items or switching the
meaning of the response scale; both require the respondent to think about individual items or else
reveal disengagement by giving seemingly contradictory responses (e.g., strongly agreeing with items
that suggest low collective efficacy as well as those suggesting collective efficacy is high). However,
the results from item-by-item Pearson’s correlation analyses seemingly disconfirm “yea-saying” (see
Table 1 below). While the items significantly co-vary (ɑ = 0.85), the specific values of single items are
at most moderately correlated with those of any another single items.
Criminal justice system legitimacy
The survey includes measures of (ingroup) criminal justice system legitimacy and the legitimacy of CJS
actors. Seventeen measures of legitimacy and its correlates are included in the survey. Table 2 provides
Approximately 70% of variance in this categorization item is unexplained by an underlying factor connecting it with
other CE items. Another explanation for the item’s variance may be legal cynicism (Kirk & Matsuda, 2011). Legal
cynicism is present when one believes the law and its agents are either ineffective or derelict in their mission to protect
and maintain order, or, worse, are intentionally oppressive. Low perceived government legitimacy comprises a cognitive
component of legal cynicism (Gifford & Reisig, 2019), though legitimacy is a distinct judgment, conceptually and
empirically. Later, I measure correlational relationships between the categorization item and legitimacy items. There is
substantial support for belief that these items, while correlated, are not tautological and measure psychological constructs
that exist independently of each other.
3
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a simple listing of these items, including their means and standard deviations (below, p. 55; legitimacy
items left unshaded). Together, these have been used in previous studies to measure government
legitimacy. Still, legitimacy scholars continue to debate the exact relationship between these constructs
and legitimacy. Item 21 stated, “People should obey the law even if it goes against what they think is
right.” Perceived duty to obey has long been the defining feature of legitimacy (Wolfe et al., 2016).
However, Tankebe (2009) has challenged this notion, arguing that felt obligation to obey is influenced
by many things, of which legitimacy may be only one. Critical work on the composition of legitimacy
judgments has also found that a duty to obey is an important outcome of legitimacy but may not be
identical with it (see Gau, 2014). In this study, I treat duty to obey as a result of legitimation, but not
necessarily its core.
Jackson and his colleagues (et al., 2012; Tyler & Jackson, 2014) have conceptualized legitimacy
as normative alignment between authorities and their subjects, i.e. “the perceived appropriateness of
an institution” (Huq et al., 2017, p. 1106). The current study reflects this construct in items such as
“The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as you do.” Trust, captured in items
such as “If a violent crime were to occur … you can trust the police to arrive quickly …,” is an
individual’s belief in the reliability of another. Easton’s (1965) work on diffuse support, foundational
in political science, posits that trust and legitimacy are distinct components of generalized support for
government.4 Within criminal justice, scholars have differed, some accepting this differentiation
(Hamm et al., 2017) and others viewing trust as a component of legitimacy (Huq et al., 2017; Wolfe et
al., 2016; Jackson & Gau, 2015). In this study, trust items are included in subsequent factor analyses
as constituent of legitimacy.
Furthermore, the survey instrument includes measures of satisfaction with government using

Easton (1965) defines diffuse support as a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept
or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (p. 444).
4
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Table 1: Correlation and Uniqueness between Measures of Collective Efficacy
In my neighborhood … (1 = strongly disagree through 5 = strongly agree)
Item 8. People treat each other with respect.
Item 9. People look out for each other (e.g., when someone is sick, take care of each other’s pets).
Item 10. People try to look out for kids and teenagers (e.g., take care of each other’s kids, intervene
if the youth were in trouble).
Item 11. People would help a resident who has been hurt (e.g., mugged, robbed, jumped).
Item 12. People feel safe being outside.
Item 13. If there was a local school closing, people would organize to try to keep it open.
Item 14. If there were a shooting nearby, people would try to raise awareness and give support to
neighbors.
Item 15. If people need help, they go to formal government systems, such as the police or elected
officials.
Item 16. If people need help, they go to informal resources such as local clergy/pastors, family,
friends, or unelected leaders.
8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

8

Uniqueness
.50

9

.65***

.47

10

.45***

.57***

11

.33***

.46***

.54***

12

.56***

.48***

.41***

.37***

13

.34***

.38***

.33***

.35***

.39***

14

.44***

.40***

.44***

.41***

.45***

.47***

15

.36***

.33***

.30***

.31***

.39***

.43***

.42***

16

.19***

.24***

.27***

.29***

.20***

.26***

.33***

.55
.64
.56
.66
.55
.71
.23***

.86

Average interitem covariance

.52

Cronbach’s alpha (ɑ)

.85

Collective Efficacy Factor Eigenvalue (λ) after varimax rotation

3.5

Notes.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Likert scale responses to rate prosecutors (item 25), judges (item 27), the court system (item 28),
people who run the jail (item 29). Current scholarship on legitimacy distinguishes it from satisfaction,
a concept of disputed definition, but which I define as the degree to which an individual’s expectations
are met or exceeded (Muller, 1970). It is crucially important in shaping justice perceptions; justice may
itself be defined as the fulfillment of that to which one is entitled (Tankebe, 2009). Tyler has used
satisfaction as a component measure of legitimacy (e.g., Tyler & Wakslak, 2004), and previous studies
have found satisfaction items correlated with general perceptions of trust and fairness, constituent of
legitimacy (Mazerolle et al., 2013). Prior factor analyses have found satisfaction items load on to the
same underlying factors as items measuring legitimacy (Hinds & Murphy, 2007). Nevertheless, given
present settlement on distinction between the two, this analysis excludes satisfaction from this analysis.
Procedural justice
A series of survey items ask respondents to rate their agreement with the following statements: The
very last time a police officer arrested or stopped you, the officer “explained why you were stopped
or arrested” (item 43), “listened to what you had to say” (item 44), “treated you with respect” (item
45), treated you “differently … because of your age, income, sex, race, or some other reason” (item
46), “took your needs into account” (item 47), “answered your questions well” (item 48), and
“clearly explained everything that would happen next” (item 50). These all measure aspects of
procedural justice within police encounters, which has been shown to improve individual judgments
of police legitimacy (see Tyler 2004; 2006). I combine these into a single measure of the most recent
encounter’s overall procedural justice. Table 3 shows the central tendency of these responses, in
addition to item 49, “The officer did their job well,” which seems to be an outcome perception of
procedural justice (perhaps more akin to satisfaction) and not necessarily constitutive of it. This item
has been excluded in this analysis.
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Phase two: Qualitative interviewing
Phase two involved qualitative interviewing, completed for 102 individuals, fifty-two from Newark
and fifty from Cleveland. In the original study, qualitative interviewing was used to supplement the
quantitative findings and to produce the “rich” data necessary to examine the underlying social
mechanisms driving the trends found within the quantitative analyses and to explore questions not
possible to address with the quantitative survey data.
Sampling strategy
Interviewing took place at Golden Ciphers and North Star in Cleveland and Bridges at St. John,
Newark Reentry and the Urban League in Newark. No interviews occurred in municipal courthouses.
An identical purposive and convenience sampling method to that used for surveying was also used
for the interviews. However, in the case of interviews, staff at host institutions helped facilitate the
process by recruiting individuals to be present at the place in anticipation of the team’s arrival at
scheduled times. Of course, this introduced some unknown degree of selection bias. Still, these
community institutions were social service agencies, either as a primary function or as an outgrowth
of their religious practice. Most of their recruitment was designed to provide interviewees with an easy
opportunity to obtain a financial reward. If there was some skew in the CCI sample, it was likely biased
toward low economic status more than anything else. Criminal justice contact itself is skewed toward
that same economic class, making any overrepresentation of this group justifiable and, arguably,
preferred. Interviewees were screened based on the identical criteria used in the first phase of the
study. Again, due to sampling trends, an additional requirement was added during the study, this time
to ensure more participants within younger age groups. Participants were promised twenty-five dollars
in gratitude for their participation.
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Interview method
The interview protocol contained 84 items and interviewees were told that it could take approximately
one hour. Interviews took place in private rooms provided by the agency hosts. Audio recording
devices were used to capture the content of the interview, unless the interviewee preferred written
notes be taken instead. Interview items were drawn from the general themes covered in the surveys,
exploring the participants’ perceptions of fair treatment by criminal justice officials, their opinion of
those agencies and system components, and overall views on the law and society. There was some
variation on item-emphasis in the interviews, depending on the relevance of some portions of the
protocol to certain participants, though later coding revealed acceptable consistency in subject matter
throughout.
The protocol contained items that should allow for exploration of the research questions, i.e.
whether officers draw legitimacy from personal legitimacy and based on their social groups and roles,
as well as how these impact assessments of their legitimacy. Qualitative items address subjects’
perceptions of individual officers (item 20), their local police department (items 18, 21, and 23-27),
police assigned to the respondents’ neighborhood (item 20), police in general (items 19), other police
departments (item 24), the courts (items 32-43) and corrections (items 44-82), and the criminal justice
system (CJS; item 87). Moreover, interviewees were asked questions that shed light on their
neighborhoods and communities (items 13-17), potentially shedding additional light on their referent
social groups. Audio recording devices were used to capture the content of the interview, unless the
interviewee preferred written notes be taken.
Sample
After reviewing interview transcripts, three interviews were excluded due to the interviewee not being
a resident of either of the cities under study and six interviews being recorded via notes, making a
narrative study of responses impossible. One transcript was missing from the files transferred to me
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from CCI and could not be recovered. Therefore, this analysis is of a final sample of ninety-two. The
demographics of the qualitative sample are as follows:

Table 4: Demographics of the Interview Sample (Swaner et al., 2018, p. 5)
Newark
Men
79%
Women
21%
Black
90%
White
4%
Latinx
10%
Other race
0%
18-24 years old
19%
25-35 years old
25%
36-45 years old
13%
46-55 years old
25%
56 and older
17%
N
52
Note: Some respondents choose more than one race.

Cleveland
76%
24%
74%
16%
4%
6%
18%
34%
20%
22%
6%
50

Total
77%
23%
82%
10%
7%
3%
19%
29%
17%
24%
12%
102

Coding process
To code interview transcripts, I read through each transcript, coding broadly for identity and
legitimacy-related statements. I focused my attention on the portions of the interviews centered on
policing. There was some variation on item-emphasis in the interviews, depending on the relevance
of some portions of the protocol to certain interviewees and their interest in discussing the topics;
nonetheless, protocols ensured relative consistency in subject matter throughout. After initial coding,
I composed a dataset quantifying basic themes important to this study, including: respondent
perceptions of police (positive, negative or mixed); respondents’ explicit invocation of a social identity
lens (yes or no); the presence of narratives about individual officers (yes or no); and justifications for
why it is important to obey police, if any (e.g., avoiding use of force).
At the conclusion of this phase and with increased familiarity with the material, it became clear
that Bell’s (2017) reframing of the work of legitimacy scholars would be the best organized frame for
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structuring thematic analyses, specifically for this population which was antagonistically oriented
toward police. As noted in the literature review, Bell’s proposal of legal estrangement as a theoretical
framework to supplant legitimacy provides a more compelling description of how social group identity
might work to enhance the negative views of those who see government as an outgroup, external
authority. I argued that, though she does not tie her work to any formal theory of identity, her positions
are rife with social identity concepts. In short, “her proposal explains how authorities are perceived
when they are assumed to be biased against an individual’s ingroup, i.e. legal cynicism, and there is
high ingroup identification (e.g., as suggested by her conceptualization of vicarious marginalization).
Seen this way, despite her disavowals of the legitimacy paradigm, Bell’s work provides perhaps the
most complete example of a model explaining legitimation, albeit only one of its pathways and for
only one subset of perceivers” (above, p. 38).
Thus, in a second round of coding, I coded interviewee narratives as reflective of the
components Bell specifies as being composite of legal estrangement, namely procedural injustice,
vicarious marginalization, and structural exclusion. Finally, in a third round of coding, I coded
narrative responses (i.e. those that told a full story of a specific event) and coded for its narrative
structure, as well as selected exemplary statements to highlight the subjects of study. The results of
these analyses, as well as of the quantitative analyses described above, is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS
In this chapter, I present the findings of the quantitative analyses described in chapter three:
1. Do different social groups assess the legitimacy of criminal justice system (CJS) officials
similarly or differently?
2. Do social groups that view government as an ingroup resource consider an authority figure’s
intragroup role in assessing CJS legitimacy?
3. Is the link between procedural justice and legitimacy mediated by individuals’ ingroup or
outgroup status in relation to the government?
These questions arise from a “spheres of identity” hypothesis: In essence, police officers’
claims of legitimacy are assessed by public audiences using a complex set of identity-based rubrics
involving primarily perceived group identity (especially a determination of ingroup or outgroup
authority relative to the perceiver) and role identity, mediated, at least in part, through the master
narratives bequeathed from the perceivers culture that shape how events are interpreted into fitting
their own life story and narrative identity. I argued in the foregoing that any comprehensive theory of
legitimation must account for audiences’ (1) categorization of authorities as ingroup or outgroup; (2)
expectations of fairness or bias; and their (3) degree of identification with their salient ingroup. The
following quantitative analyses explore respondents’ categorization of government and its influence
on perceptions of legitimacy (research question 1) and whether, for those identifying government as
an ingroup authority, these perceptions are impacted by the specific CJS role of the authority (research
question 2). A final quantitative analysis is designed to test the impact of social identity on perceptions
of procedural justice (research question 3).
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In this section, I begin by explaining the analytic methods used to answer research questions
one and two. To explore these questions, I use exploratory factor analysis (EFA) followed by
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to determine the dimensional structure of respondents’ responses
regarding criminal justice legitimacy. These analyses achieve two exploratory purposes: First,
differences in how criminal justice legitimacy is dimensionalized suggest differing calculi for how
legitimacy is determined. For example, suppose after analyzing a set of respondents I find one
underlying (“latent”) factor seeming to determine responses to most items used to measure legitimacy
(which, I would assume is, in fact, perceptions of legitimacy). Suppose as well that I find that, of the
many legitimacy items, those associated with “respect” have the strongest “loadings,” i.e. vary most
strongly in correlation to the underlying factor. This would suggest that, among this group, the most
important determinant of legitimacy is how respected one feels. Now imagine that I conduct the exact
same test with a second group, but instead find two latent factors driving responses to the legitimacy
items and, moreover, find that the bias items loaded strongest onto the first factor and respect loaded
strongest on the second, weaker factor.
If those two groups were the government-as-ingroup and government-as-outgroup
respondent sets, these hypothetical findings would suggest that the groups evaluate the legitimacy of
justice system actors differently, with one prioritizing respect and the other focused primarily on levels
of perceived bias – an answer to the first research question. Answering the second question is more
problematic: As mentioned below, the structure of the survey data does not allow for very precise
definition of dimensions. Assume now that the first group represents the government-as-ingroup set.
A single, strong latent factor with only negligible support for a secondary factors despite items
specifying specific system roles (e.g., police, courts, corrections) suggests a single judgment similarly
determines perceptions of these roles (i.e. legitimacy of the justice system) and that role-specific
perceptions are less important – an answer to the second research question.
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I answer the third research question using confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis as
methods of structural equation modeling (SEM) to determine how social identity may interact with
perceptions of procedural justice to determine respondents’ felt duty obey and likelihood of calling
the police in times of trouble (“reliance”). As noted above, there are competing models for how this
interaction plays out, particularly regarding the time order of social group identification and the
experience of procedural justice (or injustice). Moreover, studies analyzing the interaction of social
identity with procedural justice, legitimacy, and outcomes like obedience or reliance is sparse. It may
be that social identity impacts legitimacy mediated through procedural justice, or vice versa; that
legitimacy fully mediates the relationship between these constructs and outcome behaviors, or does
so only partially, or not at all; and the relationships may be mediated depending on which outcome is
analyzed. Here, CFA and path analysis will allow me to explore the pathways by which social identity
and procedural justice ultimately lead to obedience and/or reliance on government for help.
In the next subsections, I tackle these research questions in turn, further explaining the
methods used to answer them and the results of the analyses conducted. In the following subsection,
I explain the analyses and results regarding questions one and two.

Research questions 1 and 2
1. Do different social groups assess the legitimacy of criminal justice system (CJS) officials similarly or differently?
2. Do social groups that view government as an ingroup resource consider an authority figure’s intragroup role in
assessing CJS legitimacy?

Using survey data from the 651 respondents who provided an answer to Item 15 – “If people need
help, they go to formal government systems, such as the police or elected officials” – I divided my
survey sample into two groups, i.e. (1) those who view seeking help from government as a
54 | P a g e

neighborhood ingroup norm and socially categorizing government as an ingroup authority and (2)
those who do not view seeking help from government as an ingroup norm, indicating its categorization
as outgroup authority. Table 5 presents the demographics of these two sample groups.

Table 5: Demographics of the Survey Sample by Social Group
Gender (female = 1)
Average age
Race (Black = 1)
Percentage with English fluency
Percentage with Spanish fluency
Percentage U.S.-born
Percentage in long-term romantic relationships
Percentage with education beyond high school
Full-time employment
Previous incarceration
N

Ingroup
30%
39 years
76%
99%
15%
99%
40%
20%
30%
72%
417

Outgroup
33%
35 years
82%
98%
15%
99%
45%
23%
28%
78%
234

t
-0.67
-4.15***
1.65
1.28
1.30
-0.65
0.42
0.48
-0.11
0.92

Demographics across the social groups are very similar. This is fortuitous, as this circumstance
allows comparisons across very similar social identity groups. Table 5 shows that these samples are
predominantly individuals who would have experienced all three components of the criminal justice
system, from police to courts to corrections; large majorities of both samples have been incarcerated
at least once. The samples are mostly male but are each about a third female. A third of each sample
has full-time employment, with the rest supporting themselves through some other means. Just less
than half are in long-term, committed romantic relationships. Only about a fifth having more than a
high school education. The samples are near universally English speakers born in the United States,
with small, identical proportions also fluent in Spanish. The only significant demographic difference
was in age. Those who were likely to view seeking government help as a neighborhood ingroup norm
were older, with 39 being the mean age of that group in contrast to 35 for those who viewed
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government as a less relied-upon resource in their neighborhoods (𝑥̅ ingroup = 39 versus 𝑥̅ outgroup = 35, t
(623) = -4.15, p < 0.000). 5
While assuming no major difference between the two samples (ingroup versus outgroup) along
demographics, there should be differences between them on measures of legitimacy if my hypotheses
are correct. To test this, I conducted both bivariate and multivariable testing. Independent samples ttesting – which compares the means of a given metric across two unrelated groups.6 Due to potential
concerns about the normality assumption underlying t-testing, I also conducted Wilcoxon’s (1945)
rank-sum tests, which compare the distribution of responses for one group to that of another in order
to determine significant difference.7 Finally, I conducted a series of ordinary least-squares (OLS) linear
regressions predicting variance in each of the legitimacy items and found the grouping item a
significant predictive influence on legitimacy measures, after controlling for other demographics (i.e.
the site of the survey and all demographic variables listed in Table 5, p. 65).
Table 6 shows the averaged values of legitimacy perceptions across ingroup and outgroup.
Though both groups had similar levels of individual-level deviation overall (σingroup = 1.14 versus σoutgroup
= 1.22), outgroup respondents had a more negative view of government legitimacy (𝜒̅ ingroup = 3.12
versus 𝜒̅outgroup = 2.61). (In the Appendix, Table A shows the results of these tests, along with ranksum testing, in comparison to the t-test results, p. 145). T-testing showed that the groups differed
significantly on nearly every measure related to legitimacy, save those on correctional use of force and

These statistics are the results of independent samples t-tests. Significance is determined by a p-value of less than .05, as
with all analyses in this study, unless otherwise noted.
6
T-testing assumes an outcome variable that is continuous, though prior studies have used Likert scales as continuous
measures and evidence supports parametric testing with these scales (Norman, 2010).
7
Analyses of legitimacy-related item response distributions supported conflicting conclusions about which statistical
tests were most appropriate for means comparison. An item-by-item review of skewness revealed that distributions of
the legitimacy items were fairly symmetrical, though more heavily distributed in the “tails” than a normal distribution
(McNeese, 2016). Visual inspection of histograms revealed a tendency of item responses to skew slightly positively.
Results from the skewness test developed by D’Agostino et al. (1990) and the normality tests developed by Shapiro (&
Wilk, 1965; & Francia, 1972) suggested rejecting a normality assumption.
5
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systemic discrimination. Apart from a significant finding of difference between groups on items
concerning satisfaction with defense attorneys (an item not relevant for subsequent analyses) and
courts’ treatment of poor people, Wilcoxon’s rank-sum tests replicated the findings of t-testing. OLS
results produced similar results, save for a significance relationship between the categorization item
and items on courts’ treatment of non-English speakers and the poor (both cases were t-testing
showed no significant difference between groups). In sum, there is a significant difference in the levels
of legitimacy accorded by individuals grouped by their perceptions of ingroup norms, positive versus
negative, regarding government helpfulness. As the categorization item groups individuals by whether
she or he believes that, in her or his neighborhood, when people need help they make use of formal
government systems, in this analysis, the degree to which those in her or his neighborhood view the
government as a viable resource significantly predicts her or his individual perceptions of CJS
legitimacy. This finding supports those of several studies demonstrating that global neighborhood
perceptions of legitimacy predict individual-level perceptions (e.g., Antrobus et al., 2015).
To explore whether the dimensions driving outgroup-versus-ingroup perceptions of CJS
legitimacy differed only by score (low-versus-high legitimacy) or, instead, by content too (e.g.,
normative versus instrumental foci), I conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using the
seventeen legitimacy items for both the ingroup and outgroup samples. EFA tests to what degree
groups of measured variables vary together, which, when it occurs, suggests a latent unmeasured
variable invisibly driving the values of the group (Jolliffe & Morgan, 1992). To clarify the results, I
used varimax rotation, squaring the sum of loading variances to accentuate differences in the strength
of correlation between measured items and underlying factors (Kaiser, 1958). Factor analysis is often
used in analyzing five-point ordinal-scale attitudinal data (Schulz et al., 2018; Harrison et al., 2015;
Schaefer et al., 2015), but caution is warranted in placing too much confidence in the exactness of
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attitudinal dimensionalization when samples are not selected randomly, as is the case here (see van der
Eijk & Rose, 2015).
Tables 8 shows that both samples gave responses loading onto two factors each (p. 72).8
Eigenvalue patterns are similar: Both groups’ responses load onto one dominant factor (λingroup = 4.56
and λoutgroup = 4.36) and a secondary factor at about one-third the eigenvalue (λingroup = 1.68 and λoutgroup
= 1.72). The composition of these factors differed minimally between groups, and both models differ
only slightly from an identical one run using the full sample, both groups combined (results noted in
Table 7, p. 70 below, under the heading “Overall”). Reviewing the items loading onto each one, these
two factors seem to capture “normative alignment” and “perceptions of system bias,” a measure
perhaps related to legal cynicism. In each of the three analyses, nearly every item focused on treatment
by police and correctional staff (the institutional agents of state use force, i.e. law enforcement) are
significantly influenced by an unmeasured latent variable I hypothesize to be normative alignment.
Normative alignment is a significant underlying driver of assessments about moral alignment,
responsiveness, benevolence (good intention; well meaning), and respectfulness. Across both groups
and for the overall sample, the four bias items (whether courts treat Blacks, Latinx, non-English
speakers, and poor people fairly) loaded onto a separate factor, which I hypothesize encapsulates
systemic bias. Only two compositional differences were found: Whether judges were seen as arriving
at their decisions fairly was, for those who do not view government as a resource (i.e. the outgroup),
a matter of systemic bias, whereas for the ingroup respondents (and the combined overall group) this
item loaded onto the legitimacy factor. Only when the groups were analyzed as one sample did
whether laws were intended

These factor analyses were restricted to factors registering an eigenvalue of at least 1. Tabular loadings are shown postvarimax rotation.
8
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to protect people, load significantly onto normative alignment. However, this item was among the
most distinct of those in the model and had one of the lowest factor loading scores of the items.
In asking, then, whether assessment criteria differ across those who see government as an ingroup
versus those who see government as outgroup, the answer to this second research question is “no.”
Both groups (ingroup versus outgroup to government) construct and think about how to
assess legitimacy in substantially similar ways, an answer to research question 1. To answer research
question 2, I am concerned with whether these perceptions were discernable by social role, e.g. police
versus court actors versus corrections. Perceptions of CJS legitimacy seem driven by perceptions of
the overall CJS, or at least whole functions of it, and not necessarily strongly partitioned views of one
set of justice actors versus another (e.g., assessments of law enforcement as opposed to the police
versus corrections). This cuts somewhat against what might be expected by role-based SSI theorists.
I should note here that the structure of the data at hand is not optimally suited to inquiry into rolebased identity – for example, five-point Likert scales make any analyses predicated on precise
dimensionalization questionable, especially on smaller sample sizes.9 It is also likely that principal
components analyses (PCA) would be a more appropriate statistical test for detecting significant
components of a construct though all driven by a single underlying factor. EFA and PCA are designed
based on distinct theoretical premises that inform what may be informed from these analyses (Jolliffe
& Morgan, 1992). Setting aside some differences in mathematical methodology, the conceptual
differences can be best summarized by viewing PCA as a way of reducing a set of related variables
that seem to be components of something else, while EFA used measured variables to capture some

Recommendations differ for the optimal sample size for methods associated with SEM, such as CFA and path
analyses. There appears to be consensus that these methods can be used on relatively small sample sizes (Myers et al.,
2011; Wolf et al., 2013), certainly including the sample sizes of the total population and even the subpopulations
examined in this study. Nevertheless, larger sample sizes are better. This is more important when using ordinal measures,
as ordinal scales are susceptible to overdimensionalization due to inherent lack of measurement precision. Larger sample
sizes can help here, as more data points provide more statistical power for those response increments selected by fewer
(though still a meaningful proportion of) respondents.
9
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unmeasured variables driving the values of those measured. However, the former requires confidence
that the components are measured with enough precision that changes unit-to-unit represent cleaner
shifts in a metric’s value than that typically offered by Likert response scales. Moreover, the bias items
only reference courts and no other CJS role. Nevertheless, using the crude measures at hand, initial
analyses suggest that the answer to research question 2 is “no.”
In all, these results are notable for what is not found more so than for what is. Bivariate and
regression analyses demonstrate that those whose social ingroups view government as a viable source
of help in times of trouble have more positive views of CJS legitimacy across several measures, and
those who do not view government as reliable help (and, I suggest, as an outgroup authority) have
more negative views of the CJS (see Tables 6 and 7, pp. 67-68). Thus, evidence suggests a difference
in grade between the legitimacy assessments of the opposing groups. To the question of difference in
kind, though, there is little supportive evidence. It appears that both groups assess the legitimacy of
the CJS using nearly identical criteria with similar patterns of relative import. These criteria consist
mainly of how their interactions with police and correctional staff, i.e. enforcement officials, are
perceived along metrics of treatment (e.g. respect, responsiveness) and intention (e.g., benevolence,
moral alignment), as well as how fair (or biased) the system as a whole is perceived to be.
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Research question 3
Is the link between procedural justice and legitimacy mediated by individuals’ ingroup or outgroup status in relation to
the government?

To conclude the quantitative section of this study, I combine confirmatory factor analysis with the
path analysis portions of Stata’s structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the relationship
between social identity and assessments of procedural justice, as well as how this relationship
influences perceptions of police legitimacy. To conceptualize the processes involved in SEM, it is
helpful to imagine a combination of factor analysis and path analysis (Weston & Gore, 2006). Recall,
factor analysis is “a statistical test in which patterns of movement in a dataset are examined to
determine whether an underlying construct (a latent factor) not captured by direct measurement in the
data nonetheless can be predicted by measuring its unseen influence on dependent items that were
directly measured” (Blount-Hill, 2020, p. 11). The method is used, as above, to test measurement
models, i.e. hypothesized mathematical relationships between measured variables suggestive of a latent
variable to which they are all related. Common relationship to a latent variable, were demonstrated,
allows the set of measured variables to be used, collectively, to approximate values of latent,
unmeasured variables. Path analysis, on the other hand, tests hypothesized directional relationships
between sets of measured variables (Stage et al., 2004). These directional relationships may,
themselves, be sequentially related to one another (e.g., A → B → C) or bidirectional (e.g., A → B),
while also covarying in the technical correlational sense. The ability to test these variant relationships
within a single mode is a “second generation” improvement on the traditional multi-stage methods
proposed by Barron and Kenny (1986). A complete SEM involves the construction of a measurement
model (akin to factor analysis) and a structural model (akin to path analysis), and a test of fit for
hypotheses based on both these models.
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I have previously used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to reveal two underlying latent factors
driving responses to legitimacy items, normative alignment and system bias (see Table 7, p. 70). To
begin answering research question 3, I conducted confirmatory factor analyses to confirm whether a
two-factor model, as suggested by the above exploratory factor analysis, best predicts patterns in the
data at hand by comparing model fit indices. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to test how
well a hypothesized factor structure accurately predicts the relationship between the variables in a
dataset (Hoyle, 2000). The predominant difference between CFA and EFA lie in the difference
between exploratory and explanatory analyses. CFA models require the number and structure of
underlying latent factors be pre-specified and are used to test the robustness of the predicted model
for explaining patterns in the data. (Though functions in Stata and other analytical software do allow
for exploration of how to improve the predicted models, e.g., Stata’s “mindices”). CFA is now
increasingly a standard method in analyses of attitudinal data regarding perceptions of legitimacy,
particularly as the field has become established enough to presume results a priori (see Gau, 2014).
Indeed, SEM has traditionally been used as an explanatory method – i.e. to test pre-supposed
relationships – though it has recently recognized as a method suitable for exploratory analyses
(inspiring adaptations specifically for this purpose; see Asparouhov & Muthén, 2009, on exploratory
structural equation modeling or ESEM).
Because of their difference in purpose, researchers will usually use either EFA or CFA, as CFA
is expected to yield roughly the same results if constructed based on the results of EFA on the same
sample. In fact, EFA models have been shown to be remarkably accurate at producing similar factor
structures to the more exacting assumptions of CFA (Gerbing & Hamilton, 1996). Still, using Stata
software, CFA modeling provides an advantage in being compatible with model fit analyses. Here, I
use CFA to demonstrate the greater degree of “model fit” – the degree to which the specified model
accurately predicts relationships between the data – for a latent legitimacy construct comprised of a
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two-factor structure versus a one-factor structure, as suggested by the previous EFA models. Table 8
presents the results of six CFA models which support the findings of EFA above (p. 76). Several
statistical techniques have been devised to test the predictive fitness of proposed models to given
datasets. Using chi-squared goodness of fit as an incremental fit statistic, researchers compare the
hypothesized model with a “saturated” model, that is, a model that predicts all observed relationships
in the dataset, in part, by removing all preconceived constraints on correlational relationships between
the variables (Henseler et al., 2016; Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). One then compares the saturated model
to a “baseline” model, one which presumes no relationship between the specified variables. The model
that produces the lower chi- square value better fits. Additionally, comparative fit index (CFI) and a
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) values of .95 or more, and root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) values of .05 or lower, also indicate
good model fit (Cangur & Ercan, 2015; Hooper et al., 2008). Finally, Akaike’s information criterion
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics allow one to compare competing models;
a model with a lower AIC or BIC is considered better fitting.
Table 8 demonstrates that the two-factor model is more fitted to the data, and this is true for
the overall sample and across those who report an ingroup norm of seeking government help and
those who report the opposite (p. 76). CFA confirms that a model separating normative alignment
from perceptions of system bias is preferred over a model which combines the two and that the
specifications derived from EFA provide good model fit, particularly after accounting for covariance
amongst the direct measures. As mentioned above, Stata’s “mindices” function suggests which
relationships in either a measurement or structural model might be eliminated to improve model fit.
Such practices are called “trimming,” especially appropriate where analyses are exploratory. However,
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as the relationships between variables in the CFA were modeled from the results of a preceding EFA,
all the relationships specified in the model were significant. In other words, I performed the equivalent
of trimming by using the results of EFA to construct my CFA model, results that had already
demonstrated that a two-factor legitimacy construct (i.e. separate measures for normative alignment
and systemic bias) best fit the relationships seen in the data. More comprehensive results of EFA
analyses, which show those items not included in the composite variables, are found in Table B in the
Appendix.
Limitations in Stata’s programming required me to conduct path analysis in a model separate
from the CFA. This meant that the measurement and structural models for this analysis were not run
synchronously. I created composite measures of procedural justice, normative alignment, and system
bias by averaging the Likert-scaled responses (1 to 5, negative to positive) of their constitutive items.
Based on the results shown in Table 7 (p. 70), normative alignment was measured as the average of
responses to nine items: item 20 (“Laws are intended to protect people”); items 52-55 measuring police
moral alignment, responsiveness, benevolence and respectfulness; item 76 (“Judges in [my city] are
fair in their decisions”); and items 74, 76 and 77, measuring correctional staff’s responsiveness,
benevolence and respectfulness. System bias was measured as the average of items 78-81, regarding
perceived bias of the court system against Blacks, Latinx, non-English speakers, and the poor. I should
note that Stata has functionality that allows one to “predict” factor scores to derive variables directly
from the results of factor analyses (EFA or CFA), but whether this method is used versus either
averaged- or summed-scales is, at this time, still a matter of taste. I elected to use an averaged scale for
ease of interpreting my results.
Along with the normative alignment and systemic bias composites, I retained use of the item
in which respondents categorized government as ingroup resource or outgroup authority for use in
the path analysis as a measure of social identity, i.e. how the respondent sees her or his community
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positioned in relation to government. In the foregoing literature review, I explained how procedural
justice has been theorized as a mechanism for legitimation due to what it says about how an authority
regards an individual’s social ingroup (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000). I have also noted
seven items present in the survey from which I constructed a measure of respondents’ judgments
regarding the procedural justice of their last encounter with police (p. 57). For the present analyses, I
created a composite measure of procedural justice. Procedural justice was measured as the average of
seven items asking whether respondents agreed that, during their last encounter with police, the
responding officer clearly explained the reason for the encounter (item 43), listened to what the
respondent had to say (item 44), was respectful (item 45), discriminated against them (item 46), took
the respondent’s needs into account (47), and answered the respondent’s questions well (item 48) (see
Table 3, p 57).
Two items in CCI’s survey measured intended outcomes of enhanced legitimacy and should
therefore be indicative of it. Item 21 asked whether “People should obey the law even if it goes against
what they think is right.” I argued above (p. 54) that felt duty to obey the law may be influenced by
legitimacy but may not necessarily be a direct measure of it. This is a matter that is still debated
amongst some legitimacy theorists; here, I use obedience as a legitimacy outcome and use structural
equation analyses to predict it. Item 51 asked respondents if they agreed with the statement “You
would call the police if you were in trouble.” This is a measure of reliance on the government for help
(and an individual-level analogue of the categorization item) which should increase in positive
relationship to judgments about police legitimacy. Both items were measured using a five-point Likert
response scale. Using these two items as outcomes, I constructed two sets of structural equation
models using ordinary least-squares regression to test competing models about how procedural justice
is linked to legitimation through social identity. Though still exploratory given the use of secondary
data not specified to this purpose, and the inclusion of composite values derived from EFA, I
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restricted path analyses to the relationships suggested by prior literature and declined further trimming
within the structural model as I had done within the measurement model.
The first path model specified that procedurally just treatment in an encounter with police
would make social identity salient, influencing perceptions of social group identity, which then
influences perceptions of normative alignment with the CJS and of systemic bias, which then
influences responses about how well the officer performed or how satisfied the respondent was with
the officer’s performance. This specification is in keeping with Tyler and Blader’s (2000) group
engagement model, which specifies that procedurally just treatment signals to an individual their
membership in a common ingroup with the authority figure, facilitating acceptance of claims to
legitimacy. A second model oriented social identity as an exogenous variable, which then influences
perceptions of procedural justice in a specific encounter with police, which then influences
perceptions of normative alignment with the CJS and of systemic bias, which influences responses
about how well the officer performed or how satisfied the respondent was with the officer’s
performance. This specification was in accord with Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group value model which
posited that the salience of social identity is what made procedural justice important for legitimation.
Representations of both models can be found in Figure A, in the Appendix, along with a third model
to which I now turn.
After running the two specified path models for each of the two outcomes, goodness of fit
statistics revealed that the competing models performed identically given the data. This indicated
roughly equal explanatory power whether social identity was position as a cause of or result of
experiences of procedural justice, and vice versa. In response, I constructed a third SEM that in which
procedural justice and social group identity were positioned as covarying exogenous variables
(“covariance model”). In Figure 1 below, which shows the results of the third set of exploratory
models, this covarying relationship is denoted by two-way arrows and is the only covariance specified
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in the models. All other specified relationships were kept unidirectional as predicted by prior theory,
with insignificant relationships retained. Subsequent fit analyses showed that this solution best fit the
data for both outcomes. Overall, the models’ lackluster fit statistics hint at the inclusion of several
insignificant pathways. As stated above, trimming would have improved these indices, but I declined
to adjust the model based on post hoc fit analyses to maintain a test of a priori hypotheses. Table 9
presents the fit statistics for the respective models (p. 81).10 Given the exploratory purpose of the
study and its limitations in data, detailed throughout this report and in the discussion below, this model
was adequate to provide a basis for discussion and for inspiring future work, including a more rigorous
test of the directionality of the relationship between procedural justice and social identity through a
longitudinal analysis.
Given the goodness of fit, I report here only the results of the third model (the “covariance
model”) in which categorization of government and procedural justice perceptions can covary. Figure
1 presents the findings of these analyses (p. 102). Results of structural equation modeling were
illuminating. Respondent agreement with the proposition that people should obey the law and should
call police when in trouble were both most strongly predicted by normative alignment (β = .458, p <
.001; β = .542, p < .001, respectively). Regarding duty to obey, normative alignment completely
mediated the effects of both social identity and procedural justice, but only partially mediated their
effects on whether an individual would call the police if in trouble. Perceptions of procedural justice
in the respondent’s last police encounter had a direct effect on whether they would call the police (β
= .270, p < .001), but social identity also had a direct effect on this outcome (β = .272, p < .001) and

The models in Table 9 are the same except for differences in the specified relationship between the procedural justice
measure and the social identity measure. The third model, allowing covariance between the two measures, produced the
best fit statistics as it captured a bi-directional relationship between the two. The prior two models produced relatively
worse fit statistics than the third, but the exact same as each other, because specifying a direction, either way, in the
relationship between procedural justice and social identity fit equally well with the data. In essence, these models suggest
that the relationship is truly a bi-directional one and that procedural justice or social identity have equal predictive power
for one another.
10
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Table 9. Comparative Fit between the Group Engagement and Group Value Models of
Legitimation using Structural Equation Modeling
Should obey the law

Would call police

30
510
.247
.941
.410
.041
5578
5649

30
623
.247
.952
.519
.041
5703
5774

30
510
.247
.941
.410
.041
5578
5649

30
623
.247
.952
.519
.041
5703
5774

29
472
.242
.939
.449
.040
5698
5761

29
587
.242
.951
.558
.039
5821
5884

GEM: Procedural justice >> social identity
Fit statistics
χ2, current versus saturated model
χ2, baseline versus saturated model
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
Comparative fit index (CFI)
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)
Standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR)
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
GVM: Social identity >> procedural justice
Fit statistics
χ2, current versus saturated model
χ2, baseline versus saturated model
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
Comparative fit index (CFI)
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)
Standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR)
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
Covariance Model: Social identity <> procedural justice
Fit statistics
χ2, current versus saturated model
χ2, baseline versus saturated model
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
Comparative fit index (CFI)
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)
Standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR)
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)

a slightly stronger one. This suggests that legitimacy – at least as now popularly conceived of as
normative alignment – is the dominant, if not sole, psychological contributor to felt duty to obey.
However, the degree to which that translates to the behaviors attributed as outcomes of legitimacy
may be an open question. Here, reliance behaviors (i.e. calling the police for help when in trouble) are
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independently influenced by social group categorization and experiences of procedural justice,
alongside normative alignment. As for their respective contributions to the outcomes via normative
alignment, in both models social identity had a stronger effect (β = .413, p < .001 in Model 1
(obedience); β = .451, p < .001 inModel 2 (reliance)) than did procedural justice (β = .374, p < .001 in
both models). Interestingly, procedural justice was a significant predictor of perceptions of systemic
bias and this effect rendered the impact of social identity insignificant; however, systemic bias
perceptions were also insignificant predictors of the outcome variables (obedience or reliance).
Especially in the context of a respondent seemingly least likely to see police as a reliable resource in
times of trouble, this finding suggests that mitigation of Black’s self-help phenomenon may be
accomplished almost entirely by a focus on legitimacy, somewhat in contradiction to what might
expected according to Bell’s legal estrangement theory, elucidated in the literature review above. I turn
to this contention in the discussion below.
In both models, procedural justice and social identity were significantly correlated (β = .186, p
< .001), speaking to a complicated interrelation deserving of continued investigation in future work.
As noted, the GEM and GVM present competing models of the effect order between these two
constructs, and prior research supports both formulations. The current findings seem to suggest
bidirectionality, at the very least, and future studies will need to clarify this relationship by identifying
what factors could moderate the direction of effect one way or the other.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS

The previous chapter explored how individuals socially categorize government, perceive themselves
and their social groups in relation to government, and how these perceptions influence perceived
government legitimacy and related constructs. Preceding analyses suggested a substantive difference
in how those who perceive a neighborhood ingroup-based norm of relying on government for help
view CJS legitimacy versus those who perceive an opposing norm. While both groups assessed
legitimacy by reference to a common set of criteria, those viewing government as an outgroup
authority held lower estimations of the CJS across the board, even in a sample of mostly Black
respondents (typically the most cynical racial group toward the CJS) and entirely of those who had
previous experience as suspects or convicts of the CJS. For legitimacy theorists, then, a significant
question is how these groups arrive at differing perceptions of government and how this is influenced
by their outgroup identity, within the larger categories of race or offender status.
That work does little to explore how this social categorization comes to be, particularly how
an encounter with a justice official is interpreted in a way that then allows a respondent to score
performance on measures like procedural justice. If social identity has an influence on perceptions of
legitimacy and procedural justice, it likely does so through influencing how individuals make meaning
of justice officials’ actions. It is here that personal psychology meets social psychology, providing the
framework of narrative identity to conceptualize processes of meaning-making, both at individual and
group levels. In the following chapter, qualitative analysis is used to examine the structure of narrative
scripts about interactions with police officers in search of cross-sample patterns pointing to
respondents’ adherence to a larger master narrative frame (research question 4). Principally, I look for
evidence of a consistent narrative structure suggestive of the use of master narrative templates in
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describing and making meaning out of personal experiences with, and perception of, the police, and
linking those to wider stories at a cultural scale. This would suggest master narrative as a mechanism
of understanding the events of one’s individual life, then making narrative identity an important aspect
of identity just as is social group identification. I further use these interviews to explore how
interviewees reference social identity in their narratives and interpretations of their narratives.

Research question 4
Do marginalized outgroups interpret their perceptions of government through collective frames like cultural master
narratives or through individual experiences?

CCI’s survey data does not allow for a deeper analysis of how group identity-based judgments of
legitimacy come to be formed; it has only allowed me to demonstrate what comprises those judgments
and how negative or positive they are. In this section, I use the study’s qualitative data to explore how
individual interviewees, when given space and time, describe for themselves how they perceive CJS
legitimacy. In these descriptions, I noticed that interviewees often illustrated the cause of their
perceptions with supportive narratives. Analyzing these interviews, three themes emerged as
important for this study and I present them in turn in this section. First, I demonstrate the salience of
narrative as mechanism interviewees use to explain and interpret encounters with the police using a
sample of narratives. Specifically, I demonstrate a similar structure in the stories these interviewees
tell, suggestive of a master narrative script that is understood and drawn upon across interviewees.
Given this tendency, I suggest narrative identity theory, in addition to social identity, is an important
framework from which to examine identity influences on processes of legitimation. Next, I focus on
those interviewees who explicitly invoke social group identity in explaining their views of the police
and their assumptions about how police treat them. I also briefly explore those interviewees who put
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forward “alternative narratives,” i.e. where individual life stories are framed in a way that deviates from
the generally accepted narrative script (McLean & Syed, 2015). In this sample of narratives, I show
how interviewees justify their deviance from expected positions on police through weaving coherent
alternative storylines that either distinguish them from their neighborhood ingroup or link them to
another social group more likely to endorse police legitimacy as a norm. In all, this section is designed
to demonstrate the salience of narrative identity in interaction with social identity to produce how
individuals perceive CJS officials and react to their claims of legitimacy.
The ninety-two interviews that make up my qualitative sample reflect demographic disparities
in the criminal justice system in that it is overwhelmingly Black and male (see Table 4, p. 60). For
analyses of culturally constructed and transmitted master narratives, the racial homogeny of this
sample is critical to understand its results. Of note, there is much less racial diversity in this sample
than was in the survey sample, leading to a sample that is almost entirely Black. In studies of the
American CJS, the subtext in discussions of race in the justice system is that Black Americans are the
penultimate outgroup, and, of all ingroups, are most likely to see legal authorities as outgroup to
themselves. In fact, in pointing out defining features of what might be called “Black culture,” previous
work of mine has posited that cynicism toward the status quo system and its legal authorities is chief
among them:
Black culture in the United States arose at the convergence of post-British colonial American
culture and that of diverse African ethnic groups, in reaction to the oppressive, suppressive,
and dehumanizing experience of chattel slavery …. The primary point of divergence from a
common American experience has been Blacks’ persistent encounter with racial discrimination
(Blount-Hill & St. John, 2017, p. 112).
Unnever and Gabbidon (2011) find this to be of central importance in understanding Black
orientations toward the law, law enforcement, and societal institutions in general. Cynicism holds no
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matter socioeconomic status (Gaston & Doherty, 2018; but cf. Jones & Greene, 2016), but, for those
in lower socioeconomic strata, life in largely segregated neighborhoods, both over- and under-policed,
ensures frequent unwelcomed encounters initiated by officers and characterized by procedural
injustice, disrespectful treatment, and, often, illegal uses of force (Brunson & Weitzer, 2009; Weitzer
et al., 2008; Weitzer, 1999). Quantitative studies have demonstrated the connection between
mistreatment and mistrust (Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2005), but the rawness of Black sentiments toward
police may best be captured in presentations of their own words as highlighted in qualitative studies
(Cobbina, 2019; Brunson & Wade, 2019; Brunson, 2007; Brunson & Miller, 2006). The effect of
negative encounters with police are magnified when these stories spread throughout social networks
and conjure expectations of mistreatment even in those who have not encountered the police (Warren,
2011; Weitzer & Tuch, 2004). Discriminatory treatment by police becomes, in the mind of many, just
another instantiation of a ubiquitous, legalized social structure set to oppress them (Alexander, 2010).
Episodes of police violence become a cohesive narrative of state violence (Desmond et al., 2016),
wrapped in the context of structural racist violence (Farmer, 2004; Feagin & Bennefield, 2014),
evidence of an anti-black world order (Curry & Curry, 2018).
Unfortunately, as CCI’s survey respondent and interviewee samples are independent of each
other, the individuals in the qualitative sample cannot be connected to the responses in the survey.
This creates a limitation in my inability to reference how interviewees might have responded to the
categorization item used to divide the sample into those who view government as ingroup versus
outgroup authority. The limitation is particularly disadvantageous in that survey analyses showed that,
though these groups differed significantly in their perceptions of CJS officials, these perceptions
averaged to a range of middling to negative perceptions. This means that the “ingroup” sample in the
foregoing analyses could not be distinguished from the outgroup based on how negative their
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qualitative responses are regarding the police. Table 10 shows the general distribution of negative
versus positive overall assessments of the police and those who explicitly reference social identity.

Table 10: Distribution of Interviewees’ Perceptions of Police
Newark

Cleveland

Total

% of Total

Expressed perceptions of police
Positive
Mixed positive and negative
Negative

10
13
23

8
15
23

18
28
46

20%
30%
50%

Explicit invocations of a social group identities
Yes
No

25
21

21
25

46
46

50%
50%

N

46

46

92

100%

Excluded

6

4

10

Kerrick and Henry (2017) note, “a common criticism of master narrative and counternarrative
work is that the existence of a master narrative is often taken-for-granted” (p. 2). The primary purpose
of this analysis is to determine the presence of a master narrative influencing the content and structure
of narratives by this sample about encounters with police. There are features of a master narrative
which make it discernable in the stories of ingroup members: They are (a) known by the majority, (b)
define what is acceptable, (c) adopted subconsciously, (d) organize power in society, and (e) are used
to mark those who do not adopt them as deviant (McLean & Syed, 2015). Thus, as a first step, I heed
Kerrick and Henry’s warning by applying a critical eye for structural similarities that suggest a
connection between the interpretive lenses of the interviewees. In the current sample, the work of a
master narrative about police contact, if one exists, should be present across all interviewees, as the
racial homogeneity of the sample and the similarity of the Newark and Cleveland neighborhoods
makes it likely that nearly all interviewees have been relatively similarly socialized. Though evidence
of a master narrative is expected to be widespread throughout the sample, greater variance is expected
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in the degree of adherence to this master narrative script. Integrating principles of narrative theory
and social identity theory, adherence to the master narrative script should depend on the salience the
neighborhood social group for the interviewee. Thus, once a master narrative is identified, I expect
that it is most closely hewed to in narratives of those who explicitly reference social group identity (of
themselves or of police) in framing their responses, and that alternative narratives (those counter to
the master narrative) would be most present among those who less explicitly frame their responses
along social identity.
A master narrative of legal estrangement: Procedural injustice
As Table 10 shows, a majority of the sample had either negative (50%) or mixed (30%) views about
the police (80% of the total). In these eighty interviews, a recurrent theme of procedural injustice
emerged. Several explanations were offered, particularly focused on law enforcement’s excessive use
of force. Noah, a fifty-five-year-old White Jewish male quoted from an informal conversation with a
Cleveland police officer: “From the police’s own mouth … ‘Yeah, sometimes you've got to show up
and crack some skulls on the pavement.’” Over and again, respondents recounted scenes of a
disturbingly familiar narrative script in which (a) officers make contact with a protagonist (b) engaged
in lawful behavior but is (c) nonetheless accused without evidence of criminal activity and (d) subjected
to rough and disrespectful treatment.11 Where shared, outcomes are near invariably either (e1) a
discontinuation of the encounter by police with no justification for the treatment or (e2) arrest for an
undeserved criminal charge. The consistency of this story structure does not itself suggest the
formation of a collective master narrative and may, in fact, solely be explained by the fact these

In narrative identity research, a script is defined as “schemas [i.e. “organized bodies of knowledge”] that contain
information about sequences of events and the causal linkages that bind these sequences together” and scenes are “the
manifestations in a given moment in time of these abstracted affect-event sequences, along with the unique imagery that
accrues to a specific episode from one’s life” (Singer, 2004, p. 441; brackets [ ] added by me quoting a definition from
the same source, same page).
11

79 | P a g e

episodes happen to play out the same way in each individual instance.12 What does reveal the potential
presence of a master narrative is the consistency in how these events are interpreted. Respondents (f)
understood their stories as scenes depicting the legal estrangement of Black and/or poor people,
indicative of systemic bias against the entire group.
Rafael’s is a typical scene using this narrative script. I note where elements of the common
narrative are evident:
… I was [b] dressed-up nice; they automatically thought I was a dope boy. [a, d] A cop pulled my sweats
forward-out where I was exposed, where he was just looking down in my pants at all my privates, went
underneath, smacked the bottom of my pants [so] that my privates flopped and told me, [c] "Where's the
dope?" He told me that he would have no problem putting a bullet in my head and going to sleep at night, going
home to his wife and kids …. [f] It's a whole rig to meet their quota, to get the investors to keep investing
towards the department and doing whatever else they need done.
According to Rafael, he is stopped by police (a. encounter) while merely being “dressed up
nice” (b. engaged in lawful behavior). The police “automatically” assume he is in possession of illicit
substances (c. accused without evidence) and proceed to expose his private parts and then touch him
in his genital area (d. procedural injustice). Rafael whether the encounter ends in arrest or termination
but interprets the encounter as motivated by systemic bias designed to “meet their quota.” Lee told a
similar story, wherein he encounters police (see [a] below) though not engaged in criminal activity
([b]), is accused of stealing ([c]) and is detained for a lengthy time with no justification ([d]). Again, he
interprets his encounter as the result of systemic bias ([f]), as shown below.

It should be noted here that what I aim to explore is not the “objective” truth of the interviewees’ statements, but
rather how they express stories about their police encounters to an ostensibly neutral other. The narration process – how
interviewees choose to craft the story, selecting which parts to include, to omit, to emphasize, and then supplying a
“lesson learned” synopsis of their tale (or not) – reveals something about their interpretive tendencies and, at least, about
the self they choose to present to the researcher asking. Disjuncture between these narratives and narration that can be
verified has been cited in previous research (e.g., Piza & Sytsma, 2016).
12
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[c] A store thought I was stealing …. They called the police ….. [a] The police came. They didn't find anything
on me. [b] I wasn't stealing …. [T]hey checked me for everything; warrants, warrants all over Cleveland,
warrants all over the state. I had nothing. [d] I spent almost a half-hour with two police officers for nothing
….[f] Leave it to Cleveland, they're always out looking for something.
Taylor, a nineteen-year-old from Newark, told what happened to him when he panicked at the
arrival of a “train” of undercover police vehicles:
[b] Yeah, I did not know if they were cops or anything. I ran. When I sprinted, [a] they all came after me,
and I ran into the park and they caught me and [d] slammed me hard. It was one white dude who put his foot
to the back of my neck. [f] Then I felt racially profiled, I started to go off. “What are you doing putting your
foot on the back of my neck for?!” Then one of the cops that knew me said “No, he is good, he is good” because
he knew me. He let off my neck because he was on my neck real hard. [c] He asked me if I was involved in
robberies and I said no, and that is when they brought me to the scene and all of [the victims] said, “That is
not him” …. [e2] Then I still went to the precinct and got charged with everything, so I got eight months for
it.
Haji, a thirty-four year old Black male from Cleveland, offered a much more detailed account
of his encounter with police after being suspected of grand theft auto that hits these same plot points
and ends with the same conclusion: “I felt it was discrimination and bias ‘cause I was black, AfricanAmerican …” These and similar narratives reveal a shared narrative structure for stories about police
encounters, showing, first, a common theme of procedural injustice across respondents and, second,
a similar interpretations that lead to a conclusion of systemic bias. The former is demonstrative of one
element of Bell’s (2017) legal estrangement framework and the latter shows how the knowledge and
use of shared narrative templates leads to a shared interpretation of events. Bell’s work suggests that
vicarious marginalization and structural exclusion should also be present in neighborhoods where legal
cynicism is normative. As I show next, this appears to be consistent with these interviews, further
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supporting Bell’s framework as a contender for explaining how social groups come to view themselves
as outgroup to the government and to share a negative perception of law enforcement.
A master narrative of legal estrangement: Vicarious marginalization
Interviews showed evidence of vicarious marginalization. These scenes followed a general narrative
script wherein the protagonist either (a1) hears of or (a2) witnesses an instance where (b) police owe
a service to a close associate, (c) fail to provide that service, and (d) the associate suffers for lack of
service. Again, these stories end in the same takeaway: (f) Respondents interpret their associates’
experiences as demonstrations not only of the specific persons’ legal estrangement from the police,
but rather estrangement of their entire ingroup. Xavier, a twenty-five year old from Newark, described
an instance where he felt the value of a loved one diminished by the behavior of police:
I lost a friend in Newark …. The police came then. I came there, the tape and everything was already up. But
when I got there, they left his body on the floor …. Everybody see his body laying there. They got a white towel
over him. A little white towel over his body but, he had his head blown off …. Why is his body still laying
there on the street? …. People out there crying and stuff …. [T]he people was telling the cops, "Pick the body
up. What y'all doing? What y'all doing?" …. They were trying to engage but they didn't really care. His body
still sat there …. Like 10, 20 minutes.
In this telling, Xavier sees his deceased friend on a Newark street (a. witnesses b. an instance
where police should act). He questions why the police have mishandled provided the service due (c.
“Why is his body still laying there on the street?”). Read in toto, Xavier appears to be conveying the
sense that his friend’s body and death was disrespected and that, while neighborhood residents
(“they”) tried to demand service, the police (“they”) “didn’t really care.” It is eerily similar to what
JaMarion shared, a forty-five-year-old Black male from Cleveland:
[Local shooters] killed my nephew five years ago…. My nephew sat there for three hours with a bullet in
his chest …. I used to wash [the police] cars. I used to work at an all hand carwash … We was pretty good
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with them …. I told them that it made me look different at them. That they don't care about the Black folks.
All they all care about is the middle class and anybody got money. “If this was Cleveland Heights, you'd be
over there in 2 minutes …. Y'all don't care.”
Vicarious marginalization is, in many ways, the perfect manifestation of government socially
categorized as outgroup authority, as shown in JaMarion’s narrative. The “lesson learned” he takes
from his ordeal is that police “don’t care about the Black folks.” Taken with the rest of the narrative,
this statement encapsulates JaMarion’s identification with “the Black folks” as part of “us,” his
ingroup. It also shows his cognitive separation of that ingroup from the police (“they”). He also
suggests that the police socially categorize individuals (e.g., into members of “the Black folks,” “the
middle class,” or “anybody who got money”). Marginalization is comprised of social discrimination,
i.e. the differentiation of one group from another, but also the subsequent devaluation of a
differentiated group. From JaMarion’s narrative, it seems clear that he perceives “the Black folks” as
not only outgroup to the police, but also as devalued by police. Moreover, JaMarion’s narrative is
exemplary in one additional way – He best exhibits what befits the term “estrangement.” Using the
Merriam Webster definition of the term, estrangement technically involves negative affect in a
relationship where positive affect once existed. For most Black individuals, it is likely that positive
feelings toward police (e.g., seeing them as “the good guys”) diminish beginning very early in life, but
JaMarion is one of the few who narrate the exact moment when this shift occurred in his life course.
Unlike stories of personal interactions with police, most vicarious experiences of
marginalization were presented as generalized summations of several events, all, however, with a
similar lesson learned about the bias of the system and its uselessness as a viable resource.:
Terry: … [M]y brother-in-law, they killed him, because they say he had a gun, and he didn't. He had nothing.
Talking about he reached for something, and they shot and killed him inside the car …. [T]hey still be
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disrespectful to people. Throwing them on the ground, choking them, extra stuff, they don't have to do all that
…. [T]he first thing they do is pull out a gun.
JaMarion: They don't care. They ride past…. They just keep riding …. A lady got beat up yesterday. They
kept on riding past.
Alexander: I've seen then treat people who jaywalk like crap, and then turn around and jaywalk right after
them …. I've seen them punch people who they're arresting, like they sneak in a side jab, stuff like that just
because.
Zula: [I]t's just what you've seen gone on in the news, friends, families, maybe how they were treated. It's just
kind of that stigma of things can go back with the police …. I think of that little kid who was shot. I think
of another case where two people were killed in a car by police and they shot like 40 or 50 bullets into that car.
Lee: My father's been pulled over. My sister's been in jail. My half-cousin's been in jail. This is what we're
used to.
Kwame: I'm mostly working all the time, but a lot of the interactions I hear about is always nasty. I have a
brother who's been beaten by the police a couple times. Family members that have been beaten by the police ….
They killed my uncle. I really don't like the police. They killed my uncle.
Sultan: The gentleman in the news who ... He and his girlfriend got pulled over in a routine traffic stop and
they got the kid in the back of the car, and the cop shoots the guy.... That sticks in your mind. That could've
been me.
I should note that lack of narrative detail, typically seen as inferentially important in narrative
identity research, is likely here reflective of the limitation of using secondary data for exploratory
research. The qualitative interviewing instrument used by CCI did not ask about the marginalization
of others – that such stories were told unprompted might be indicative of the importance of this
aspect of legal estrangement.
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A master narrative of legal estrangement: Structural exclusion
Respondents provided stories in which (a) they were owed a service by the police and (b) the police
failed to provide that service. Procedural and interactional injustice occurred when police responded
to calls for service, just as they had with police-initiated encounters, and “good” customer service was
often denied. In other words, individuals expressed experiencing the third element in Bell’s (2017)
model for legal estrangement – structural exclusion. Individuals were excluded from the ambit of
service presumed an entitlement of membership in the societal ingroup. Together with narratives of
procedural injustice and vicarious marginalization, suggests her framework might most fully capture
the substantive themes common in narratives of police encounters amongst those mostly likely to
view the government as an outgroup authority. The common narrative structure of these stories
further suggests that this estrangement is understood and conveyed, at least in part, through master
narratives whose templates are used to interpret these encounters. These interactions (c) reinforced a
sense of legal estrangement due to the individual’s social ingroup being, in fact, an outgroup in relation
to the police. Vesper’s story about encountering a Newark police officer demonstrates this point:
They were actually doing construction on my street about a week or so ago. They had signs up that said “No
Parking.” Okay. Cool. But they dug up holes in the street and, where I live, I park in my driveway. Right at
the end of the driveway it's a two-foot hole, so I'm about to go out and handle some business and I can't get
out. I'm like, “Why can't I get out?” The cops say, "Well, you need to read the signs around here." [a] I said,
"I'm reading the sign. The sign says no parking on the street. It says nothing about I can't get out my driveway."
[b] "Oh well you seem like you have a problem” …. [W]hy are you treating me as if I'm doing something
wrong and you're being nasty to me? …. [c] Everybody pretty much has the same stands on the cops. “Listen,
you guys aren't here for us.”
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Perhaps unfortunately, several such stories involved not just a denial of customer service and
respectful treatment, but a relinquishing of the police duty to protect life. For example, in Cleveland,
Lee told the following story:
… [A] couple of years back, I was robbed …. [c] Next time I get robbed I might as well let him shoot me
because you guys didn't do nothing for me …. I called 911 …. I was already in the ambulance when the police
came. The police said that if I didn't go to the hospital, they were going to take my baby because I was hit in
the head and that can cause brain damage and trauma and stuff like that. So I ended up going to the hospital,
which was the plan anyway. I called my mom. The officer that came to my sister's house even called my mom.
"We got a description. Your daughter's seen him. Your daughter chased him." Told my mom everything I said,
and [a] told my mom, if they have any information, they were going to call her or go to my sister's house. Two
days went by. Three days went by. Four days, five days went by. Nothing. A week, two weeks. Nothing ….
When my mom called the police, the police said no one was found. Another description of a similar person was
made for another robbery and they had them confused. They told my mom the guy that robbed me wasn't found.
There was nothing of him in the system. [b] There was no complaint made. But you guys came to my sister's
house. How was there not a complaint made? My head was gushing blood. How was there not a complaint
made? When you guys got there, I was in the ambulance …. There was never a complaint made …. I talked
to the police officer. My sister was there. She saw my head bleeding. I had bruises and scratch marks on my
arm.
Meanwhile, Jamir, a twenty-three-year-old Black male, told the story of his getting shot:
… [a] I got shot in my uncle ‘hood …. [b] It took [the police] thirty minutes to get there …. I got shot two
and a half inches away from main artery. It took the ambulance forty-five to fifty minutes to get there. If I
would have got hit in my main artery, I would have died …. Like they was telling me all this at the hospital.
They was like, “[I]t really took them that long.” ….[c] [T]he police, like if you're in the hood, honestly if you
don't say a white man just got shot and robbed, they don't care.
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The affective impacts of direct personal experiences of procedural injustice and denial of service, along
with vicarious experiences of marginalization combined to produce cynicism towards police shared
across respondents. There are ample examples throughout the interviews of respondents expressing
a deep legal cynicism towards Newark and Cleveland police, including accusing some of engaging in
illegal drug trafficking, sexual assault and murder, as well as indifference to human suffering. Yael and
Rafael expressly confirm that their views are held by many of their peers:
Yael: I talked to a couple [of people in the neighborhood] and not just that, the conversation will pop
up in front of me and the feedback that I got back, just to summarize it, is cops are assholes.
Rafael: They say they fight, but at the same time it's pretty much sometimes you listen to people and their
conversations and they say pretty much [the police are] like the mafia in blue. You sometimes find it hard to
question them people.
Bell (2017) proposes that the result of this combination of factors is a group-based, macrolevel legal cynicism, and the convergence of objective exclusion (if respondents are to be believed)
and a subsequent feeling of cynicism and disillusionment is the socio-psychological recipe for legal
estrangement. Implicit, then, in this framework is that members of a social group are marginalized by
the police, as a group, due to their outgroup membership, that they perceive this difference as a social
group phenomenon (e.g., a matter of “us versus them”), and thereafter psychological position
themselves as separate from, cynical of, and possibly even oppositional to, the police. The above
quantitative section concluded with an assertion that legitimacy is measured based on perceptions of
normative alignment and systemic bias. This portion of the qualitative analyses suggests that evidence
of normative misalignment (e.g., procedural injustice) and systemic bias (e.g., vicarious marginalization
and structural exclusion) get framed in accordance with a master narrative script commonly known
and drawn upon by individuals within neighborhood ingroups. Next, I explore whether this process
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is concentrated among those who explicitly see police encounters on the basis of social group identity
and provides examples of how individuals narrate social group identity.

Social group identity in narration
Reviewing the interviews, exactly half were coded as invoking an explicitly social group-based
interpretive lens (specifying either themselves or the police as defined by their social group), while the
remainder described their views of police mostly by reference to individuals and personal experiences
(see Table 10, p. 88). Negative, mixed, and positive views were not equally distributed across these
two groups. Those who expressed their opinions of police in social group terms were strongly skewed
toward negative opinions about the police, whereas those who expressed their views individualistically
where more evenly distributed, Χ2 (2, N = 92) = 13.6, p = .001. The above findings support the
presence of a master narrative framing police encounters as negative, the finding that this framing is
concentrated among those who explicitly reference their social group status in comparison with the
police points to an interpretive master narrative at work. Research question 3 asks whether individuals
who view the government as an outgroup authority use interpretive master narratives in understanding
their encounters with police or if they construct these independently by looser reference to social and
cultural norms and their own experience. Taken with the findings above, what follows demonstrates
that not only are negative perceptions of police not individually constructed (as previous research has
shown already; e.g., Gau et al., 2012), but that narratives about the social group landscape are key to
how interviewees understand and explain the origins of these perceptions.
While many respondents characterized police as a defined social group separate from their
own, several of them pointed to the police themselves as the cause of this group division. Narratively,
these were explained by two primary script structures. First, officers make clear their ingroup allegiance
to one another when (a) an officer engages in misconduct and (b) other officers favor the offending
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officer as against resident constituencies. Second, officers make clear their bias against a perceived
outgroup when (a) officers target an individual and (b) show their motivation is rooted in bias through
overt procedural injustice and rough treatment. Again, the takeaway from either of these stories is that
(c) police favor others in their law enforcement ingroup and view Blacks and other marginalized
groups are disfavored outgroups.
Jacob, a forty-eight-year-old Black male from Newark, provided a narrative example of the
first of these:
One day I was catching a seizure, so I put my back up against the wall. I started sliding down. I went to go
into my pocket to get my pill. [a] One of the transit cops kicked me right here, right on my nose. I have a little
scar right here. Then he hit me right here, kicked me right here. I have a bruise – show this right here. I was
hit with a flashlight when I was handcuffed by transit because he said I attacked him first, but when they look
at the cameras, they see that the cop kicked me first. All of them know that I'm an epilepsian. [b] Every time
they see me, "Don't press charges on our brother. He didn't mean it." "Bro, this on camera, it shows him
kicking me. What you want me to do?" [c] Every time something go wrong, you all want to stick up for each
other. When you all wrong, you want to cover up for each other.
Jacob’s general sentiment was reflected throughout the interviews. In Cleveland, Keegan put
it this way: “… [I]f you're a cop who is supposed to be a good cop but you know that you're partner's
doing stuff he's not supposed to be doing then you're a bad cop.” Dakota invoking the group-based
dynamics of crime-fighting:
[W]hen we used this drug in war on drugs, or war on this and war on that – when we use these types of slogans
and stuff like that, any type of war, if you have a war, you have an enemy in your head …. You have a target.
My thing is, you all use this when you talk about drug dealers or you talk about the gang bangers or you talk
about the criminal elements that are in Cleveland – who and what are you talking about? Who is your target?
…. How does your target look? Too often I feel like me, as a Black man, I feel like we are targeted. My son
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-- I have a son – little cousins, nephews. I feel like they are targets of the police department and once again I
don't feel the police officers do enough.
Noah, a White male, offered evidence of a social group divide in a different way:
[J]ust because I'm a white guy … I don't have to worry as much about them unloading multiple clips into my
body [like] they have done on, like, multiple occasions with people reaching [for] their phones or whatnot. I've
also had interactions with them outside of a police setting, when they've been drinking, and they just straightup tell me. They're like, "Yeah, no, we're a gang. We are a gang and we have to have our power be known on
the street, that we're the top gang in the city." That was frightening to me, because that's not what you want.
You want to feel safe when there's police, not like "Oh shit, it's one of those guys” …. So, I mean, white
privilege is definitely a thing, and I've seen it, and I'm going to use it when I have to, when I can.
In fact, some of the best articulators of law enforcement’s bias against disfavored outgroups
came from White respondents who observed the operation of white privilege, “an invisible package
of unearned assets … like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools,
maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear and blank checks”
(McIntosh, 1989, p. 10). Noting story elements, below is a narrative from Parker, a White male,
described an incident that occurred in Cleveland:
When I'm with my friends, I can see how I get treated differently. I'm the last person that gets searched. Probably
not even searched. They just mainly look for the Black guys …. I was selling weed and they raided my buddy's
house …. That was scary because they came in and [a] they kicked the back door in. The dog bit them. They
shot the dog. It was a three round burst. Then my buddy's dad has epilepsy and he was watching TV and they
threw him off the bed. He has a bad back and they put the gun on his back, and he had burn marks because
the barrel was hot. It was a Black guy that was one of my friends and they were like, “You again.” They kneed
him and he actually peed himself where they kneed him in his area. I'm clinching up just waiting for my turn.
They kicked my buddy ... [b] When he was on the ground, they kicked him. They didn't even do nothing to
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me. I was just so nervous. They didn't believe me that the stuff was mine. I manned up. They didn't want to
believe me that the stuff was mine. Probably because I was the only white guy in the house. I played that card.
I just played that card …. They were like, “What are you doing down here in this neighborhood?” …. They
just took my stuff and then three months later I got indicted. It was trafficking, criminal tools and possession
…. They just took our stuff. They said they were watching us and they said a guy with the pony tail sold to us.
We ended up figuring it out. It was some lady that must have been an informant …. [M]y other friend [ ] has
a pony tail and we know [ ], he sold her a sack …. So they came in there looking for someone different. Once
I manned up and told them where my stuff was …. [b] They just didn't believe me. They thought that I was
taking the rap for somebody else. They were like, “These ain't your friends.” Don't do this, don't do that.
That's probably why they didn't take me to jail. They probably just thought I was taking the rap….[c] When
the police pull up and everybody run, I don't. They just run after other people. Mainly, because I know because
I'm white.

Alternative narratives
Those who espoused more positive views of the police were almost exclusively found among those
who also did not use an explicitly social group-based understanding of their relationship to police.
Interviews presented several examples of alternative narratives, those more positive than typical. These
came predominantly from the eighteen interviewees whose interviews were more positive than not,
but were also found few and far between within the transcripts of those who felt mostly negatively
toward police. Many fewer positive sentiments were supported by detailed narratives, however,
alluding to what previous narrative searchers have found regarding the lack of narrative development
and coherency in respondents attempting to convey deviating stories (e.g., McLean et al., 2018). Ajani,
a thirty-two-year-old Black male from Newark, told perhaps the most fully formed story depicting
police in a positive light:
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For one thing, I seen a guy that was out there always panhandling. One cop, he took it upon himself to say,
"Look, if I get you a job," – instead of him keep locking him up for being over here – he's like, "If I get you
a job, would that help you?" [The panhandler] said, "Yes, I would stay out of here." [The officer] was
like, "Yo, I got somebody with job. Take this number down." He gave him the number instead of arrest[ing]
him. I think that's better than arresting him because that's helping him to keep him out of [jail].
Still, Ajani’s interview demonstrated mixed feelings about the police, notable given that
narrative identity theorists have noted the ease with which discordant narratives can be exceptionalized
and dismissed as flukes in order to retain adherence to master narrative scripts. Those who more
completely take a position counter to their ingroup’s dominant narratives find it harder to convey their
feelings in coherent narratives, as they must do so without the help of well-rehearsed and commonly
shared scripts. Dontrell, a fifty-eight-year-old Black male in Newark who expressed a majority positive
view of the police, gave a much less detailed account than Ajani’s:
My daughter-in-law's phone got stolen, and she had a tracking device. The police, the beat-walkers were out
there, they was nice enough to come to the edge rail. So then I told them where the phone was, but nobody would
answer the door. But they did help me out like that.
Due to the paucity of detailed alternative narratives, there could be found no general template
present in expressions in support of police. Instead, positive depictions of police were not in the form
of narrative scenes but qualitative descriptions of individual feelings and beliefs. These feelings
centered on a utilitarian need for safety (“I don't know what it'd be like without them,” Montrell),
understanding the stress of the job (“it’s a hell of a job,” Shemar), and the human limitations of law
enforcement officers (“They can't be everywhere at every point,” Zula). Feechi, a fifty-one-year old
Black male in Newark, expressed the most complete and consistent sense of a duty to obey police
directives, often taken as the definitive evidence of police legitimacy (cf. Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012;
arguing that too often researchers do not account for “dull compulsion”). However, Feechi never
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supported his reasoning via narrative evidence, only through describing his feelings, and did so based
on his identity as a Christian not as member of a common social group with police:
God got them for a reason and a purpose to protect and serve. I realize that when we do wrong or commit a
crime it's their duty to arrest us, put us through the court system so we can be punished for crimes that we
committed …. I used to kind of get upset when there was a shooting of a Black teenager, but, as a Christian,
I had to learn how to forgive our enemies, pray for those who do spiteful use you. I couldn't hold no vengeance
towards them, no anger, animosity towards them when they shoot a Black victim, or [engage in] police brutality
…. [A]s a Christian, I've got to be putting that in the hands of the Lord. The Lord'll take of care it. I don't
look down or dislike them for what's going on. I just pray on it and hope these things'll get better …. Me, as
a Christian, I've got to obey my rulers and authority, and whatever the police officer tell something to do, if I
disagree with it, I do it…. I used to have animosity towards them, when [someone] Black is murdered by police
with excessive force, such as the teenager, whatever his name is …. I just had to let that go. God will take His
plain vengeance. It's the Lord. I can't hold that against him. I'd be in the wrong. That's why I said I'm a
Christian, so I just love them, respect them and just move on in life. They say, "Black lives matter." I feel that
all lives matter.
The lack of narratives framing support for the police is interesting in that is further supports
the idea that narratives rely on easily accessible master narratives to provide templates for their
structure. Among a sample whose neighborhood ingroups are reasonably assumed to disfavor police
as outgroup authority, predictions drawn from narrative identity theory seem “spot on.” Those who
deviate from the dominant master narratives find themselves without a means to coherently articulate
and interpret their experiences. Feechi did reference social group identity, but Christian identity rather
than a racial one; perhaps police encounters are not sufficiently salient for majority of those in this
faith to facilitate the development of a Christian narrative on such interactions. Here, then, the salience
of concepts from narrative identity theory is striking. The body of work provides a useful explanation
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of mechanisms by which perceptions of legitimacy (which the foregoing analyses determines is based
on normative alignment and systemic bias) are embedded within social groups and cultures. Moreover,
focusing these analyses on this sample allowed me to suggest the substantive content of these
legitimacy beliefs for individuals who view themselves as outgroup to government, as well as the
structures of the specific narratives through which they convey those beliefs. To answer research
question 3, initial analyses supports an assumption that specific master narratives are incorporated
into personal identity and used to interpret subsequent encounters with police.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
When members of the public accept claims of government authority, civilians are more likely to
comply with official directives, be satisfied with government efforts, be supportive of the justice
system mission, cooperate when asked and initiate positive engagement (Blount-Hill & Yeom, 2016;
Tyler & Huo, 2002). The present study sought to enhance the effectiveness of strategies to do this by
highlighting the importance of social identity in legitimation and answering important questions about
how legitimation processes are influenced by perceptions of one’s social group in relation to
government and the justice system. If legitimation operates in the way I suppose, officials may divide
the public into two important constituencies – those who view them as ingroup authorities and those
who perceive them as outgroup enforcers.

Discussion
This study drew upon three theories of identity to shed light on how one’s perception of self in relation
to others may influence their perceptions of CJS legitimacy. I hypothesized that identity was comprised
of a social group-identity, role-based identity, and a narrative self, and that each of these dimensions
– spheres of identity – made important contributions to how people viewed authorities’ legitimacy
claims. I explored hypotheses arising from these three bodies of literature using survey data and
qualitative interviews. Utilizing the former, initial exploratory factor analyses suggested little
distinction between these two groups in the fineness of legitimacy perceptions (as measured by
number of underlying factors) or the substantive rubric used to derive these perceptions (see Table 7,
p. 70). Among those who view it as normative in their neighborhood ingroups to rely on government
for assistance in time of trouble, perceptions of normative alignment (that is, moral alignment,
responsiveness, benevolence and respect) and systemic bias were crucial criteria for assessing CJS
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legitimacy. The same concerns animated judgments about CJS legitimacy among those who perceived
a neighborhood ingroup norm of spurning government assistance. Confirmatory factor analyses
supported the conclusion that a two-factor model was indeed well-suited to describe survey responses
regarding CJS legitimacy for the entire sample, the group viewing government as ingroup authority
and those viewing government as outgroup authority (see Table 8, p. 76). Perceptions of the CJS were
driven by a desire for humane and dignified treatment, with respect and without discrimination,
supporting prior suggestions of invariance across groups in legitimation processes (Wolfe et al., 2016)
and factor analyses of legitimacy which have confirmed the importance of procedural justice (Hinds
& Murphy, 2007).
Nevertheless, comparative analyses including t-tests, Wilcoxon’s rank-sum tests, and ordinary
least-squares regression also showed that there was a substantive difference in the positivity of
judgments about CJS legitimacy between those who viewed government as ingroup authority versus
outgroup (see Table A, Appendix, p. 145). This difference held despite the samples’ relative
homogeneity in race and prior criminal justice experience, group-level characteristics that predicted
the quality of legitimacy assessments in previous studies. Thus, in addition to race and other grouplevel variables, the social psychology of group belonging is a critical aspect in determining how
neighborhoods see themselves in relation to their local governments, whether as members in a
common social collective or as competing social groups. The way to address this and to enhance
legitimacy appears rooted in the same phenomena policymakers have ostensibly tackled for decades –
fair treatment, good intention, neutrality – nothing new. Why, then, if we know the answers, have we
continued to fail?
One answer is that, while we have known the effective strategies for enhancing legitimacy for
decades now, policymakers have neglected to adhere to them. It is also difficult to translate abstract
principles about fairness into day-by-day practice. A still additional obstacle was revealed in this study’s
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qualitative analyses. Reading the interviews of a sample with mostly negative perceptions of the police
(see Table 10, p. 88), the power of longstanding and widely referenced master narratives about police
mistreatment became evident. Narrative identity theorists have built a strong body of work
demonstrating the importance of narrative in how one frames their life story and researchers have also
shown that this interpretive framing is predictive of future actions and life course outcomes. Only
recently, however, have a few of these theorists turned their attention to the master narratives from
which individuals borrow templates to structure their own personal stories.
Exploring the transcripts of ninety-two individuals who had contact with the criminal justice
systems in Newark and Cleveland began to show evidence of how commonly-held master narratives
become important interpretive frames for individuals evaluating their interactions with, and
perceptions of, legal authorities. I found that interviewees’ recalled encounters with police tended to
contain common narrative elements and leading to the same overall conclusion. The shared “lesson
learned” was, put succinctly, that the police were not a reliable or effective resource and, in many
cases, where outgroup authorities acting counter to the interests of the respondents’ ingroup. The
results of the qualitative analyses showed that interviewees tended to narrate their experiences with
police along the thematic lines put forward by Bell (2017) in her legal estrangement model.
Respondents provided stories of experienced procedural injustice, vicarious marginalization, and of
structural exclusion, all leading to feelings of legal cynicism and estrangement. These stories,
consistent, coherent, and common, evinced features suggestive of an underlying master narrative being
used to explain and give meaning to police encounters.
While Bells framework is a helpful shorthand for organizing these themes, they are long known
in literatures across disciplines that examine police relations with heavily minority communities like
those reflected in these samples. What was learned by this particular analysis, though, was the
connection between the two: How do individuals go from a bad experience with police to adopting a
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broad cynicism towards the law and, still more, how does this norm get so replicate itself near
identically across individuals within a neighborhood? The answer offered here is narrative.
It became evident in my review of interview transcripts that interviewees had a ready template
by which they could structure their stories about police encounters that also supplied them with a
ready interpretation of those encounters. Depending on situational circumstances, narrative structures
differed somewhat, yet consistently featured unjustified suspicion and mistreatment on the part of the
police. Interviewees then made a leap that was not necessarily apparent from the facts of the story but
somehow was a strikingly consistent takeaway – the police saw the interviewees not as an individual
but rather as part of a disfavored and criminally-inclined social group. Belief that police harbor racist
views are widespread and the commonality of this belief amongst interviewees, but itself, does not
reveal anything that might not be explained by individuals being generally aware of reports about race
and policing. What is more revealing, but requires a more nuanced examination to notice, is that a
group of individuals from similar neighborhoods independently reference similar themes of legal
estrangement, independently assume group-based discrimination as its cause, and then use a similar
narrative structure to make the connection between legal estrangement and its social identity roots.
Moreover, the narrative structure used by interviewees was not random or inevitable. The
negative feelings endorsed by the narrative were more concentrated among those who explicitly
referenced social group identity in their stories (p. 91). Those in this same sample who deviated from
the master narrative had trouble coming up with narrative alternatives in the moment (p. 95). It is
unlikely this struggle for coherence is merely because this group somehow uniquely lacked storytelling
ability; instead, a better explanation is that they found themselves caught without a master narrative
from which to draw. The trouble this causes for policymakers is that master narratives not only provide
a template for story structure, but they also provide an interpretive lens to discern the meaning of the
story. Efforts to enhance legitimacy, to demonstrate normative alignment and systemic neutrality, will
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run into the countervailing headwinds of an oppositional master narrative lending easy explanations
for even innocuous police encounters. Government officials, especially the police, need also to give
attention to how this narrative might be changed.
A significant part of that change in narrative must address feelings of exclusion or
marginalization, in addition to procedural injustice. This is shown by the structural equation analyses
conducted to answer research question 4. In both SEM models, how the survey respondent viewed
their neighborhood ingroup norms regarding government was a stronger predictor of perceptions of
normative alignment than were perceptions of procedural justice (see Figure 1, p. 102). This means
that where normative alignment is a crucial influence on a desired outcome (e.g., respondents’ felt
duty to obey), how they saw their social group in relation to government was a more important factor
for enhancing normative alignment assessments. Even where directs effects on a desired outcome was
seen (e.g., respondents’ willingness to call police when in trouble), social identity played a larger role
in shaping that response (if only slightly) than did procedural justice – and this in addition to its still
stronger influence on the still significant effect of normative alignment.
For theory, these analyses suggest two important points. First, differences in perceptions of
CJS legitimacy are likely the result of disparate treatment as opposed to different group-based
psychological mechanisms of legitimation. Previous studies of legitimation invariance have
demonstrated this by showing that individual characteristics and social group identifiers (e.g., race) do
not significantly change the nature of legitimation. These did not consider social group phenomenon,
though, arguably a more influential domain for social identity-based legitimation theories. Second,
Soss and Weaver (2017) chastise scholars of American politics for not recognizing that, for some
marginalized groups, enforcement agencies are so dominant a force in their community that they
represent “the government” for those individuals. My results also suggest that enforcement dominates
how previously justice-involved individuals view the “justice” system. Among the two componential
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factors for legitimacy, normative alignment was the much more pronounced driver (see Table 7, p.
70) and consideration of the courts was only a minor influence. This pattern held across groups.
Half of the qualitative sample described their experiences in explicitly group-based terms (see
Table 10, p. 88). Legitimacy theorists within criminal justice have only recently re-emphasized early
foundations in social identity (e.g., Radburn et al., 2018), but narrative themes invoking social identity
in these respondents suggests its continued salience. That said, current criminal justice theorists should
familiarize themselves with the nuances of identity theories (e.g., differences in Tajfel’s (1972) work
and Stryker’s structural symbolic interactionism or “identity theory”), and should be part of
contemporary debates and developments in the field (e.g., critiques of the theory by system
justification theorists and notable rebuttals; see Blount-Hill, 2020). Finally, social identity was only
expressly referenced in about half the sample. While this does not mean that it was not at work in the
conscious or subconscious minds of the other respondents, this suggests the need for exploring the
alternative narratives of those who are not as guided by ingroup master narratives. Brewer’s (1991)
theory of optimal distinctiveness suggests that individuals are in constant search of how best to
embrace individual uniqueness while also fitting in. Criminal justice researchers may contribute to
mainstream identity theorizing by exploring alternative, deviating narratives as both the consequence
of low group identification and/or attempts at individual distinctiveness, inter alia.
Structural equation modeling produced results, however, that call into question the
relationship between social identity and perceptions of procedural justice. Validation of these findings
in subsequent studies would disturb the theoretical certainty with which criminal justice legitimacy
scholars currently invoke the precepts of Tyler’s group value and group engagement models (Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000). In reviewing the results of the foregoing structural equation
models, social identity certainly is an important influence on legitimation processes, as the GVM and
GEM propose, but this impact may be mediated only through perceptions of legitimacy and not via
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legitimacy’s influence on perceptions of procedural justice. Mine is not the first study to question
foundational understandings of the social identity-legitimacy-procedural justice link (see Bradford et
al., 2015). Nevertheless, due to the exploratory nature of this study and its many limitations, I am
cautious to asserting a full-throated critique of current legitimacy theory on account of these findings.
The present study provides evidence of the need for further exploration of group-based social
identity as determinative in legitimation processes. It is important to note that the significance of the
categorization item in these analyses is not conflated by other polarizing variables such as race or
criminal justice involvement. Demographic measures collected in this study were not statistically
different between the groups. It is particularly important to note that among those demographic
measures was CJS-contact, which did not differ between the groups. This study shows that
categorization by whether one views government as ingroup, or outgroup was important for the
construction of legitimacy assessments. It does not, however, provide an explanation for what formed
these groupings in the first place. That must be the subject of a future study.
It is readily apparent that the police and criminal justice officials are individuals, differing by
personality, comportment, demographics, and background. It is also clear that they often behave
similarly, being, as they are, members of larger institutional and systemic bodies organized around
similar goals and mandating certain behavior. Moreover, as persons, they also belong to several social
groups (e.g., racial or religious groups) which may cause members of the public to make assumptions
about officers based on non-justice group identity. Thus, members of law enforcement manage
multiple roles – multiple identities – depending on the situation and the degree to which forces and
circumstances pull them into a representative or more personal role.
Men do not act similarly in all situations. They perform distinct roles in which they as
actors are metaphorically different persons. Actually, however, they are the same
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persons, which suggests that some variable amount of integration among roles occurs
(Matza, 1964, p. 51).
Limitations
Of course, these analyses are limited in several ways. This study was exploratory. An imperfection of
using secondary data is that the researchers’ questions were not in the mind of those designing study
instruments and so are not optimally captured. The social categorization item measuring the norms of
an individual’s social ingroup regarding the helpfulness of government – an item crucial in this study
– was not originally designed for that purpose. While I presented one interpretation of what this item
represents, others may also merit consideration. Also, important concepts, including the social
categorization of government, consist of only one or a few items.
The sample was not randomly selected. It was administered to a non-general sample obtained
through non-randomized methods for a purpose different than what it has been used for in this study.
Social identity theory emphasizes that group differences become most salient in times of group-based
contention. Because the survey was conducted with individuals who were either currently involved in
criminal adjudication, or had recently been so involved, this likely increased the salience of group
tension against the police and criminal justice system. This fact makes it impossible to generalize these
findings to the overall population, though one might argue that critically low perceptions of legitimacy
are also not randomly distributed – we should do more to study those populations for whom
legitimacy is most in crisis. These limitations are not uncommon for criminal justice studies but are
significant enough to require sobriety in what we take away from the study’s results. At any rate,
exploring a topic and being left with discernible, yet not answered questions is, fortunately or not,
typical of social research.
This study took place across two cities, Cleveland and Newark and, so, there may be important
differences in perceptions due to the location at which the respondent resides. In fact, previous studies
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have shown that neighborhood perceptions of legitimacy are influential to individual perceptions (Gau
et al., 2012). OLS regressions testing the significant influence of demographic characteristics, including
the social categorization item and the city site of the respondent’s survey, produced significant results
only for the former and not the latter (supra p. 50). Another consideration is that there is not
information about the composition of those individuals who were approached in either Newark or
Cleveland but declined to participate in the study. This opens the possibility that the difference
between the participating sample and those who did not participate is due to an important variable yet
unknown or unaccounted for. Still more, I have no information regarding the baseline demographics
of the cities’ population who have been touched by the criminal justice system. I could not find
accurate demographics for the cities’ jailed population, much less at the time of the study, and certainly
not those who are released from jail or were never incarcerated but were nonetheless engaged by
police or arrested and released, all aspects of the sample population under study. This means that it is
unclear how representative the CCI sample is of the population it may be seen to represent.
Qualitatively, the narratives explored here were obtained through a qualitative study not
intended to gather narratives. While this can be done where respondents nonetheless communicate in
stories (Adler et al., 2017), levels of detail decline when researchers do not prompt and encourage
narrative elaboration. Moreover, it is possible that some orientations (e.g., individual versus social
group-based; positive versus negative) are less inclined to narrative expression unless specifically
prompted, skewing the narrative data here explored. One notable limitation was in the coding: While
I could compare my overall legitimacy coding to that of CCI’s research team, I conducted this initial
exploratory coding as a solo research team. While our profession must not use resource limitations as
a means of excluding research and researchers, it is preferable that qualitative work of this sort be
conducted in collaboration with others. In compensation of this weakness, my data is available upon
request and approval by CCI.
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A fifth limitation is one that is common to survey and quantitative work: validity. It is
impossible to know for sure that constructs adequately operationalize concepts being studied and that
is true here as elsewhere. This is addressed through the study’s use of validated measures of legitimacy,
procedural justice, etcetera (Swaner et al., 2018). Still, because the question that the original study was
designed to answer differs from the current research question, some constructs for the present study
have only a few items that measure them, reducing the validity that comes with multi-item
measurements. This limitation is both a result and determinant of this study’s status as exploratory,
rather than explanatory. The survey was also constructed in a way susceptible to acquiescence bias,
and while I attempted to demonstrate that its effect was not prohibitive of my analysis, it influence
may have exerted a truly powerful impact on the similarity in ranking between items. This is a
significant weakness in the data that can only be resolved in a future study. Of course, potential issues
also come from questions of interviewers’ influence on respondents in both survey and interview
formats (i.e. social desirability bias). In the end, however, I believe the limitations of this study are not
too tall to conquer but are notable enough to encourage further study of any results rendered. This
study shows that categorization by whether one views government as ingroup or outgroup was
important for the construction of legitimacy assessments. It does not, however, provide an explanation
for what formed these groupings in the first place. That must be the subject of a future study.
Theoretical implications
This work lays foundations for at least two major lines of continuing theory development. First, I have
attempted to outline the components necessary for a comprehensive social identity theory of legitimation.
This need arises from an observation that current legitimacy theory as applied within criminal justice
literature is rather exclusively focused on ingroup interactions, encounters between authorities and
subordinates assumed to belong to the same social ingroup (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1998; Tyler & Blader,
2000). Both the group value model (GVM; Lind & Tyler, 1998) and the group engagement model
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(GEM; Tyler & Blader, 2000) were developed from the premises of social identity theory (Tajfel,
1969). I have argued, however, that they were influenced by Tajfel’s work on ingroup identification
and depersonalization processes and neglected to incorporate much from his work on intergroup
conflict. Instead, I would argue that a comprehensive model of legitimation must explain the
legitimacy-related processes (1) when the civilian (a) socially categorizes an authority as a member of
their own ingroup or (b) as representative of an outgroup; (2) there is an expectation of (a) respect
from the authority or (b) bias; and (3) when the civilian (a) strongly identifies with their ingroup or (b)
only weakly identifies with that ingroup.
The current work begins to tackle the need to explore these various dimensions of authoritysubordinate interactions. Findings from factor analyses and path analyses suggests that whether the
civilian is considers the authority as an ingroup or outgroup representative, procedural and
interactional justice are equally relevant. Setting aside the need for additional empirical support for
these findings, theoretically, there remains a need to explain why this is so. Heuer and Strossner’s
(2011) work suggests that it is as important for individuals to believe their social group is shown
respect by an outgroup authority (as indicated by the outgroup individual’s treatment as a
representative of that group) as it is for individuals to believe they have been shown respect as
individual group members by their ingroup authorities. If this is so, empirically similar results
demonstrating the importance of procedurally fair treatment could be capturing the outcomes of two
very different perceptual processes.
More research and theorization are valuable here if for no other reason than to more accurately
explain why procedural justice may be equally relevant across populations with widely different
relational orientations toward police. However, there are empirical and real-life observational patterns
that may also be explained by potential implications from ingroup-versus-outgroup perceptions of
procedural justice. For example, while procedural justice from authorities may be important both for
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ingroup and outgroup individuals, outgroup individuals – taking their treatment as indicative of an
outgroup authority’s respect for the individual’s entire ingroup – may be more impacted by vicarious
experiences of other ingroup members when assessing legitimacy. It is unclear what percentage of
unexplained variance in models of legitimation can be attributed to perceptions of the vicarious
experiences of others, but the foregoing discussion suggests that the proportion may be significant
among individuals who consider their encounters with police not to be meetings between individuals
but rather between opposing social groups.
Procedural justice has also generally been found to be more important an indicator of
procedural justice than have outcome measures, including measures of distributive justice. Those
studies though have mainly utilized samples with majorities of civilians having limited interaction with
the police. Developments in procedural justice theory have suggested that judgments about the
fairness of a process serve as proxies for determining whether an outcome is fair when lack of
familiarity makes one uncertain about their treatment (Blader, 2007; Wolfe et al., 2016). However,
when one is familiar with a process and can therefore base the fairness of an outcome on their
experience as opposed to the apparent fairness of their treatment, this calculus can change. Ståhl et al.
(2008) find that outgroup members give more priority to outcomes than to process when they expect
outgroup authorities to be unfair. These findings suggest a need for greater empirical and theoretical
work exploring whether the balance in relative importance between procedural justice and distributive
justice is mediated as one’s experience with the criminal justice system increases. While interesting
theoretical questions, the present data does not provide much help in analyzing these, as it was
designed to focus on measures of procedural justice.
Within populations that identify themselves more closely with criminal justice authorities, the
current research design leaves much to be desired in better measuring the influence of social role as
opposed to social group. Factor analyses showed that both groups – those believing their
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neighborhoods were likely to call on government for help and those who believed their neighborhoods
would not – had similarly conflated perceptions of criminal justice system actors, without empirical
distinction between system roles (e.g., no discernable differences from police to correctional officers).
While this finding suggests a lack of distinction by role within this sample, for several reasons pointed
out above, the data were not well-formulated to answer the question. I mention the structure of the
survey, but the sample also may be ill-suited to detect perceptions specific to role if, as I hypothesized,
this distinction occurs more significantly within groups believing themselves to be in a common
ingroup with criminal justice officials. Recall, the entire sample is largely minority, poorer, and with
previous arrest histories, meaning that those respondents seemingly more positive toward the justice
system are only so relative to others in the sample. In other words, as shown in Table 6, the actual
spectrum reflected in this data is from neutrality toward the justice system to hostility toward it. Thus,
whether those who feel positively toward the system and feel more connected to its actors as common
ingroup members will then hold role distinctions as more important remains an open and unanswered
question.
Perhaps because Tyler’s work (with Lind, 1988; or with Blader, 2000) has its roots in social
identity theory, studies investigating the social dynamics of identity in relations to legitimation have
almost exclusively drawn on SIT instead of Stryker’s (1980) structural symbolic interactionist theory
– despite that fact that SSI is possibly more suited to interpersonal intragroup dynamics. Admittedly,
the lack of empirical direction on how SSI might play out in terms of legitimacy and legitimation
process makes it more difficult to speculate. However, one might imagine that ingroup individuals
might judge justice officials more precisely on the specific expectations of their roles versus on a
general sense of respectfulness. A study designed to measure this and other SSI hypotheses is needed
to develop this line of inquiry further.
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I noted two major lines of theory development. Outside of a more comprehensive social
identity theory of legitimation, I also propose a social identity theory of shared narrative. Drawing
from narrative identity theory, and specifically from McLean’s work (with Syed, 2015; et al., 2018) on
master narratives, I propose that the construction of meaning by applying familiar storylines to explain
experiences with criminal justice officials may be a powerful mediating process to (de)legitimation.
This holds both policy and theoretical value should the proposition be borne out in further study. As
a policy matter, the insertion of narrative as an important mechanism of interpretation and, indeed,
identify formation, makes the work of improving police-community relations much more intensive.
Such work would require the creation and widespread adoption of an alternative narrative that better
allows for positive interactions between police and outgroup civilians. Still more, construction and
adoption of a narrative where justice officials and neighborhood residents are viewed as unified in a
single social group requires even more intensive and consistent effort. Regarding theory, incorporating
narrative identity within criminal justice legitimacy theory will require (1) a greater engagement with
narrative criminology and personality psychologists, (2) the role of cumulative experiences for the
individual and her social group as constitutive of ongoing and shared storylines, and (3) the use of
narrative as meaning making and the role of meaning in the interpretation of personal experiences. It
is also suggested that narrative may be the mechanism through which vicarious experiences, already
shown to be important in legitimacy research, are adapted into an individual’s attitudes and
perceptions about criminal justice officials.
Policy implications
Ultimately, the purpose of criminological research should be to support positive change in the social
world, occurring most commonly through changes in criminal justice policy. Criminal justice actors
have worked for decades to secure greater trust and cooperation from resident constituencies through
enhancing their legitimacy by practicing procedural justice (e.g., Tyler et al., 2015). The present work
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supports the continuation of these efforts as important bases by which residents of any neighborhood
judge the fairness of legal officials, despite its general closeness or alienation from government
authorities. If both ingroup and outgroup individuals conceive of justice and legitimacy in the same
way, then the litany of policy proposals that have emanated from these previous decades continues in
relevance with equal force for both groups. These include the practice of procedurally just policing,
judicial processes, and treatment in correctional settings. Such treatment is marked by respectfulness,
helpfulness, impartiality, transparency, and the providing others the opportunity to exercise voice. We
have known this now for so many years that the most important policy proposal researchers can
continue to put forward is, simply, DO IT. Recent scrutiny of police practice across the United States
shows that even these simple lessons are far from foundational in our current criminal justice system.
This foregoing analyses also seem to suggest that individuals do perceive the system as that –
the criminal justice system (CJS), not just cops versus courts versus corrections. I found no support
for role-based categorizations of justice officials, only for systemwide perceptions. That means that
an important policy implication to come from this research – one little emphasized in large numbers
of articles that focus on just one of these components – is that justice systems need to approach trustbuilding and legitimation systemically. Improvements in prosecutorial practice may have little impact
on perceptions of the CJS in the context of rampant police misconduct, sense of neglect during court
processing, and dehumanizing carceral experience. Each criminal justice actor must therefore seek
ways of syncing reform and improvement efforts with the others. Where this is not possible, criminal
justice actors must advocate for – agitate for – better practices from its counterparts. For example,
prosecutors’ offices can divert prosecutions of minor criminal infractions (disincentivizing over
enforcement by police) while zealously prosecuting police misconduct (incentivizing humane and
proper conduct). They can support efforts to improve case processing times, increasing resources for
the public defenders, and streamline their interactions with the court. They can also make incarceration
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an absolute final resort in criminal cases, lowering the housing burden on corrections systems, as well
as promise to prosecute criminal misconduct within correctional facilities. Activities of this sort, in
combination with efforts to cooperate with other agencies where possible and to improve the fairness
of its own internal and external policies and practice, provide more than enough work for present
prosecutors to begin tackling.
Finally, a primary purpose of this study was to bring attention to the import of narrative in
shaping how residents interpret their encounters with criminal justice officials such as the police.
Findings bring to fore that it is not important only to change behavior – which, if the stories of these
respondents are to be believed, must certainly change – but to change the meaning of that behavior
and how it is interpreted by those who feel themselves marginalized from government. Interesting
proposals have begun to surface that consider the importance of storytelling as catharsis. Recently,
Professor Roddrick Colvin and I suggested that truth and reconciliation models (TRM) may offer
fertile ground for addressing non-criminal instances of sexual misconduct, particularly given the
attention on these incidents by the #MeToo movement (Colvin & Blount-Hill, 2020). Might TRMs
also hold some promise for the frayed relations between minorities and police forces highlighted by
the #BlackLivesMatter movement? Jurisdictions are beginning to explore this area, seeking to reframe
and reset past narratives of mistreatment and exclusion into forward-looking stories of coming
together and reconnecting (Conde, 2020). Similar calls have arisen seeking to make criminal justice
agencies more aware of the cultural narratives from those they serve, including projects that promote
the grassroots collection of oral and critical histories. Sincerity has become an emerging topic within
procedural justice research (e.g., O’Brien et al., 2019) and researchers can greatly assist policymakers
in further exploring this subject. Principles of recognitional and corrective justice seem to suggest that
any such narrative reset must begin with criminal justice agencies explicitly saying “sorry.” An apology
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signals both the close of a prior story of violation and the beginning of reconciliation. It only does so,
though, when coupled by meaningful corrective action.
Future Research
The current study should serve as launchpad for further research efforts in this area. Social identity
within the criminal justice sciences is receiving renewed attention, much needed as it has not
necessarily kept pace with developing theoretical models in its home discipline of social psychology
(Blount-Hill, 2020). A first step is to re-examine the questions posed here with data more fit-topurpose. While I was a research assistant for CCI during the data collection for the present study, my
own questions were not fully formed enough, nor not closely aligned enough, to have allowed for a
better specified (for my purposes) set of research questions. In my future research, the use of more
traditional and robust measures of social group membership, identification, and the social
categorization of government must be feature of subsequent survey instruments. More rigorous study
of role-based identity must also follow this work, with measures specifically designed to detect the
absence or presence of cognitive and conceptual distinction in perceptions of legitimacy by
professional or agency group. Stryker’s (1980) structural symbolic interactionist theory has received
scant attention in criminal justice studies in comparison to social identity theory and limitations in the
present data have exacerbated that trend here. The situation calls for greater exploration of role-based
identity and its relevance for perceptions of criminal justice officials. Moreover, an expressly narrative
qualitative instrument will allow for deeper and more precise exploration of narrative form and
function, data which may be analyzed thematically or transmuted for quantitative analyses.
In this work, I have proposed ideas such as “spheres of identity,” and social identity theories
of legitimation and of shared narrative. This latter proposition is especially novel in that it draws from
McLean et al.’s (2018) master narrative theory, based in personality psychology, and Tajfel’s (1972)
social identity theory, foundational to social psychology. While I have relied on interpretations of Bell’s
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sociological (2017) legal estrangement theory, there remains an enormous amount of room for
theorizing. I have already begun setting the stage for this long-term endeavor. It bears stating though
that theorizing from a starting part where narrative is an interpretive tool that shapes perceptual reality
quickly brings the researcher to difficult and perhaps uncomfortable tensions highlighted roughly by
the falsely dichotomous debate between positivist versus constructivist philosophy. We, too, have our
own narratives upon which we rely to interpret “objective” truths (Guba & Lincoln, 1982). An obvious
place to start, then, is reflexive analysis of the narratives of the self – of my self – that pervade my own
research and how those too may rely upon master narratives. I have already explored cultural
interpretations of my scholarly experience (Blount-Hill & St. John, 2017) and of my scholarly practice
(Ajil & Blount-Hill, 2020), but it a step soon-to-come must be the role of cultural narrative as evinced
in my scholarship. Of course, to do so requires also work to reveal the influence of culture not just in
my own work – which might feed into harmful narratives of Black partiality – but also in the work of
my colleagues across disciplines despite impassioned claims of objectivity.

Conclusion
Social categorization is the primary means by which we understand other people. As we use our social
group identifications to determine our actions, we expect that others do the same. Thus, how
authorities are categorized relative to our ingroups is determinative for how we assess their legitimacy.
This purpose of this work is to set the stage for a more comprehensive model of legitimation, one
that accounts for interactions between members of shared social group identity and those who view
government as outside their salient ingroup. To be sure, this work (like everything involving identity)
will need continued evolution and refinement. What these analyses have done, however, is provide
reason for more targeted efforts to disentangle the influence of social identity on legitimation. I have
begun work down a path to understanding how we might expand understanding of a more
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comprehensive explanation of legitimacy attitudes and processes of legitimation by a more nuanced
and complete application of the social identity theory that has formed the basis of so much legitimacy
theorizing.
Narrative identity scholars have done much to advance knowledge on how individuals
construct personal life stories, using themes of redemption and growth, among others, to give
continuity to their pasts, their present, through to their futures (see McAdams 1985; 2013; & McLean,
2013; & Guo, 2015). These scholars, coming from the field of personality psychology, have begun to
explore how the narratives of our lives are constructed using scripts from our broader cultural context
– master narratives – serving to link our stories to one another through common narrative structures
and general plot points (e.g., McLean, 2008; & Syed, 2015; et al., 2018). It is here that the personal
meets the social, a transition from a purely personal to a social psychological process through which
issues of sociological import, such as crime and justice, both influence and are influenced by
individuals through shaping meaning making through narrative. By integrating advances toward a
more sociological narrative identity theory with the insights derived from social identity, legitimacy
theorists and the criminal justice field more widely might become a site of novel theory development.
Here, I have begun inquiry into what might be called a social identity theory of shared narrative, in
which the social group norms influence individual perceptions and behavior through enculturating
master narratives that shape how events are interpreted and assigned meaning. The integration of
social identity theory and narrative identity theory lead us further down the pathway to the “complete
theory of self” that Stets and Burke (2000) called for.
What we know of personal identity formation can also shed light on how we identify and
categorize others, including as legitimate authorities or not. As a police officer, I encountered
anecdotal evidence of the various ways in which identities influenced citizen behavior toward him and
his colleagues. More than the advance in legitimacy theory that this and further inquiries will have,
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more than the fine-tuning of methodological studies in legitimacy that this research seeks to inspire,
it is for these street-level patrol officers that this research is primarily done, them and the officials
charged with leading the agencies, profession and government that they are called to represent. As
such, I would be remiss if I did not seek to create avenues of public scholarship from this work and
encourage my colleagues to do so. In a recent proposal by Professor Heath Brown and myself, we
noted that despite calls for public criminology (Loader & Sparks, 2010; Uggen & Inderbitzin, 2010)
or newsmaking criminology (Barak, 1988; 2007), that still far too little of this activity takes place. The
knowledge we gain – extracted, so-to-speak, from marginalized populations like those in this study –
is then hoarded and sequestered from their reach or the reach of anyone with the power to help them.
Of course, a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of how police may work to enhance
their legitimacy can add much to the effectiveness and success of police practice. Perhaps more
importantly, a critical part of future research on identity and perceptions of justice must be to break
the boundaries of our own ingroups and to use our knowledge to help craft new narratives of hope
and inclusion for those we have historically marginalized.
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